How the Philippine Army’s 10th Infantry ‘Agila’ Division Is Rewriting AFP Strategy
For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines built its doctrine around internal security, fighting insurgents in jungles, mountains, and far-flung barangays. But that era has ended, and a historic strategic pivot has begun. What was once a military shaped by counterinsurgency is now being pushed into one of the world’s most militarized flashpoints: the Indo-Pacific, a region now defined by great-power rivalry, contested sea lanes, and the militarization of strategic islands from the Spratlys to the Senkakus. The battlefield has changed and so must the Philippines.
This shift matters because the Philippines is no longer shielded by distance; it now stands at the literal frontline of a geopolitical storm. China’s coercive operations, over 200 militia and coast guard incursions in a matter of months, aggressive naval formations, high-pressure water-cannon attacks, laser harassment, and drone mapping attempts, mirror precisely the pattern of gray-zone escalation faced earlier by Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Japan experienced this in 2012 when Chinese vessels and aircraft began circling the Senkakus almost daily. Taiwan confronted it in 2024 when PLA drones probed Kinmen’s defenses. Vietnam saw it during the 2019 Vanguard Bank standoff when Chinese survey ships shadowed Vietnamese vessels for months. Now, the Philippines is living the same trajectory, one that every nation on China’s periphery eventually confronts.
Just as Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force shifted from civil defense to island-defense and anti-ship missile deployment, and Taiwan restructured its entire force after repeated PLA drone incursions, the Philippines is undergoing its most significant doctrinal transformation in nearly 40 years. The AFP can no longer operate as a counterinsurgency army; it must evolve into a credible deterrent force capable of responding to modern, multi-domain conflict. Other nations made this pivot when they realized maritime pressure was only the first phase of a larger strategic contest. The Philippines has now reached the same point. Why the U.S. Wants Taiwan to Fund Philippines EDCA Military Bases?
This is why the 10th Infantry “Agila” Division, a unit once defined by its campaigns against the NPA, is now pioneering the AFP’s shift toward external defense. Its new mission aligns with Horizon 3: building a joint, intelligence-driven, multi-domain force capable of confronting not just insurgents, but destroyers, long-range missiles, electronic warfare, espionage drones, and hybrid threats spreading across the West Philippine Sea. The transformation reflects what experts have long warned: internal peace buys time, but external threats determine the future of the nation.
As defense strategist Chester Cabalza puts it, “For the first time in generations, the Philippine Army must prepare not for mountains but for multi-domain conflict.” And like Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam before it, the Philippines is now rewriting its doctrine to survive and shape the new security landscape of the Indo-Pacific.
THE STRATEGIC SHIFT — FROM ISO TO EXO
The 10th Infantry “Agila” Division’s transition from Internal Security Operations (ISO) to External Defense Operations (ExO) is rooted in a major accomplishment: its mission at home has largely been achieved. Operating across the Davao Region (XI) and portions of Regions XII and XIII, the division once fought some of the most resilient NPA fronts in the country. Today, every one of these zones is officially free of active NPA combatants, marking a rare and hard-earned victory in the AFP’s decades-long counterinsurgency campaign. This internal stability, once difficult to imagine, has fundamentally changed the division’s operational landscape.
As the guns fell silent in Mindanao’s interior, the division shifted focus to stability operations designed to prevent any chance of resurgence. Community Development Teams (CDTs) were deployed to reinforce peace gains through livelihood support, local partnerships, and continuous engagement with vulnerable communities. These initiatives have produced measurable results. In Davao Occidental, for example, CDT efforts between 2024 and 2025 led to a 23% growth in cooperative incomes, an economic boost that significantly lowered the risk of insurgent re-mobilization. The transformation from conflict zones to stable, functioning communities demonstrates how security and development have worked hand in hand.
With internal stability now firmly in place, the 10th ID is no longer tied down by the demands of counterinsurgency. This newfound strategic freedom creates an opportunity unprecedented in the division’s history: to redirect training, planning, and capability development toward territorial defense. The shift from ISO to ExO is not merely administrative; it represents a reorientation of doctrine, purpose, and mission. The division is now positioned to support the country’s broader defense strategy, especially in confronting external threats in the West Philippine Sea and bolstering the AFP’s emerging multi-domain posture. The core insight is clear: securing the home front has unlocked the capacity to focus on defending the nation’s frontiers.
External Defense Operations (EXO) — The New Doctrine
The Philippine Army’s transition to External Defense Operations (ExO) is now taking shape through major initiatives that signal a doctrinal overhaul. One of the most significant pillars of this shift is the Battalion Certification and Evaluation Program, the first large-scale battalion-level exercises conducted by the 10th Infantry Division in recent years. These exercises integrate artillery units, cavalry and armor elements, combat engineers, and infantry forces in combined-arms scenarios. This represents a deliberate move away from the small-unit, guerrilla-oriented tactics used in counterinsurgency, and toward preparing maneuver battalions for high-intensity, conventional warfare. The message is unmistakable: the Army is training for a different kind of fight.
A second defining element of this doctrinal evolution is the introduction of large-scale movements across multiple battalions and domains. As Division Spokesperson Maj. Mark Anthony Gadut explained, “As we shift from ISO to EXO, the higher headquarters saw the need to slowly apply large-scale movements.” This strategic recalibration now includes coordinated field maneuvers involving several battalions, simulated amphibious reinforcement drills for coastal contingencies, and joint movement training supported by Philippine Air Force lift assets. These activities are designed to enhance mobility, responsiveness, and the ability to reposition forces rapidly during external-defense scenarios, skills rarely needed during counterinsurgency operations but essential for modern territorial defense.
This transformation within the 10th Infantry Division aligns with broader national objectives under the AFP Transformation Roadmap 2030, which envisions a force capable of joint operations, interoperability with strategic allies, and credible territorial defense. The Army’s new role became particularly visible during Balikatan 2024–2025, the largest iteration in the exercise’s history with nearly 17,600 troops participating. For the first time, Balikatan featured HIMARS live-fire drills and integrated joint maritime targeting, clear indicators of a multi-domain operational approach. The Army played a central role in these activities, highlighting its expanding responsibilities beyond land warfare and its growing integration into air, maritime, and missile-based deterrence networks. Through these reforms, the 10th ID is not just adjusting its training; it is redefining its mission for the Indo-Pacific’s emerging security realities.
RISING ESPIONAGE CONCERNS — A NEW BATTLEFIELD
As the Philippines shifts toward external defense, a new and less visible threat has emerged: foreign espionage activities targeting military infrastructure. Recent reports indicate that a foreign state attempted to deploy drones to map sensitive facilities within the 10th Infantry Division’s area of responsibility. While the incident was swiftly contained, it mirrors a broader pattern seen across the Indo-Pacific. In 2023, Japanese authorities reported Chinese drone flights near missile bases in Kyushu, raising alarms about intelligence collection against Japan’s upgraded strike capabilities. A year later, Taiwan documented repeated incursions by PLA drones probing defensive sites around Kinmen. These developments illustrate how unmanned systems have become frontline tools for strategic reconnaissance and shaping future battlefields.
In response to these threats, the 10th Infantry Division has tightened its counterintelligence posture, prioritizing early detection and rapid reporting protocols. Base perimeter monitoring has been reinforced, incorporating improved surveillance measures and stricter access control to prevent unauthorized mapping or observation. Just as critical, the division now maintains quicker information-sharing channels with national security agencies, ensuring that any anomalous activity, particularly drone operations, can be assessed and escalated in real time. This reflects a growing understanding that intelligence breaches no longer occur solely through human agents but through digital and unmanned platforms designed to exploit gaps in defense readiness.
The strategic implications are profound. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs Doctrine warns, “Information is the first weapon in modern conflict.” Espionage is rarely an isolated act; it often precedes more aggressive operations such as targeted strikes, sabotage, electronic warfare, or gray-zone activity intended to undermine a country’s defenses without triggering open conflict. For Mindanao, an increasingly important strategic hub due to its airfields, logistics nodes, and emerging role in external defense, the task of preventing foreign intelligence penetration is now a central mission. Protecting the region’s strategic footprint is no longer just about physical defense; it is about ensuring that adversaries do not gain the informational advantage that could shape the next phase of confrontation.
THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA (WPS) DIMENSION
Although geographically distant from the frontline, the 10th Infantry Division emphasizes that Davao and the wider Mindanao region remain deeply connected to the unfolding tensions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). The first and most immediate link is economic: roughly half of the Philippines’ total fish supply originates from waters adjacent to or directly influenced by the WPS. As Chinese maritime pressures tighten, Filipino fishermen face shrinking fishing grounds, declining catch volumes, and rising operational risks. These disruptions ripple far beyond coastal provinces, affecting national food security, market pricing, and rural livelihoods in Mindanao, where fish is a staple commodity and fisheries support thousands of families. What happens near Ayungin Shoal or Scarborough Reef eventually finds its way to the markets of Davao City.
Energy security forms the second critical dimension of this connection. The Philippines imports more than 96% of its fuel, making it one of the most energy-dependent countries in the region. Potential gas reserves in Reed Bank and nearby offshore zones offer a pathway to reducing this vulnerability, an opportunity that becomes vital as global oil prices fluctuate. However, persistent Chinese interference in Philippine exploration efforts directly undermines the country’s future energy prospects. For Mindanao, which depends heavily on fuel imports for transportation, agriculture, industry, and electricity generation, unresolved tensions in the WPS translate into long-term instability in power costs and energy planning.
The third link involves trade and logistics. The South China Sea carries approximately $3.4 trillion in global commerce every year, making it one of the most essential maritime arteries in the world. Any disruption, whether through blockades, military incidents, or rising geopolitical risk, would immediately impact Philippine exports, cargo operations in Davao’s shipping hubs, and nationwide prices. This vulnerability became evident during the 2024 water cannon incident at Ayungin Shoal, when global shipping insurers raised premiums by 11–14% for vessels operating near Philippine routes. Davao-based exporters of bananas, pineapples, and industrial goods reported increased shipping costs within days, demonstrating how maritime volatility in the WPS can cascade directly into Mindanao’s economy and contribute to national inflation.
Recognizing these interconnected risks, the 10th Infantry Division also plays a role in strengthening the national narrative around the West Philippine Sea. The division is tasked with amplifying sovereignty messaging, supporting public awareness efforts, and reinforcing the strategic importance of defending maritime rights. Through community engagements, reserve force integration, and information campaigns, the division helps build public consciousness around why the WPS matters, not just for Luzon, but for the entire Philippine archipelago. As Maj. Ruben Gadut succinctly put it: “Geography may separate us from the West Philippine Sea but consequences will not.” The statement captures the central point of the Army’s doctrinal shift: in a maritime conflict, every region of the Philippines is affected, and every region has a role to play.
THE 10ID MODEL — WHAT IT SIGNIFIES FOR THE AFP
The transformation of the 10th Infantry “Agila” Division signals a defining moment for the Armed Forces of the Philippines: the gradual end of the insurgency-centric era. For decades, Philippine Army doctrine revolved around jungle warfare, small-unit engagements, and long-term population-security operations. With Southeast Mindanao now cleared of active insurgent fronts, the 10ID has become a prototype of what the future AFP must look like. Instead of preparing for protracted guerrilla campaigns, units are now being trained for coastal defense, rapid deployment, and joint-force operations. This marks a fundamental departure from traditional counterinsurgency, positioning the Army as a key player in territorial defense rather than solely an inland security force.
This shift also shows a broader move toward multi-domain preparedness, a capability traditionally associated with advanced militaries. The Army’s mission is no longer confined to land operations; it must now integrate seamlessly with the Navy for maritime security, with the Air Force for airlift, ISR, and air superiority support, and with Cyber Command to counter electronic threats that accompany modern conflict. Increasingly, the AFP must utilize space-based assets, including satellite imagery and communications, to maintain situational awareness across the archipelago. This inter-service integration is critical for responding to external threats in the West Philippine Sea, where decisive action requires real-time coordination across land, sea, air, cyber, and space domains.
A useful comparative example is Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), which underwent a similar transformation starting around 2012. After decades focused primarily on homeland security and disaster response, Japan reoriented its ground forces toward coastal defense, rapid island reinforcement, and the deployment of anti-ship and anti-air missile units. This shift was driven by rising tensions with China over the East China Sea, an environment that closely mirrors the Philippines’ current strategic challenges in the WPS. Like the JGSDF, the Philippine Army is now learning to think beyond traditional infantry operations, adopting a role that integrates fires, mobility, sensors, and joint operations to defend strategic maritime spaces.
The 10ID model, therefore, represents more than a localized evolution, it is a blueprint for the AFP’s next-generation doctrine. It reflects a military preparing for an era where threats are external, multi-domain, and technologically sophisticated. As the division pioneers the shift toward ExO readiness, it sets the precedent for how the Philippine Army will train, fight, and operate in the Indo-Pacific’s rapidly changing security environment.
CONCLUSION — A NEW SECURITY ERA FOR THE PHILIPPINES
The 10th Infantry Division’s transition from internal security operations to external defense represents one of the most significant military transformations in modern Philippine history. After decades of counterinsurgency-focused doctrine, the division has emerged from a region once defined by conflict and instability to become a pillar of the AFP’s new territorial defense posture. Its evolution symbolizes a nation that has secured peace at home and is now ready to confront the challenges beyond its shores.
This shift carries broader national meaning. The 10ID’s transformation embodies the Philippines’ readiness to face external threats, particularly as tensions in the West Philippine Sea intensify. It reflects a military adapting to the realities of multi-domain warfare, maritime security contingencies, and an Indo-Pacific region increasingly shaped by China’s aggressive naval movements, persistent drone espionage, and gray-zone tactics. In this environment, the Philippines must develop credible deterrence and operational readiness, not only through modernization of assets, but through doctrinal innovation and unified national commitment.
The path ahead requires coordination across all levels of government, military services, and civil society, but the groundwork laid by the 10th Infantry Division demonstrates what is possible when internal stability allows a nation to refocus on defending its borders and asserting its sovereignty. The sentiment captured by the Strategic Studies Institute in 2025 summarizes this transformation best: “A nation that secures its people internally earns the time to defend its borders.” Mindanao’s peace has become the foundation for a stronger, more resilient Philippine defense posture, one prepared for the realities of a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific.
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