Philippines’ Bold Move: Mini-Lateral Diplomacy Takes Center Stage in South China Sea Showdown
In the early hours of a humid July morning in 2024, a Philippine Navy patrol boat spotted a cluster of Chinese militia vessels encroaching on its waters near the contested Spratly Islands. Tensions flared as the standoff unfolded, with the Chinese ships refusing to leave. This was not an isolated incident—it was a stark reminder of the persistent threats the Philippines faces in its own backyard. While larger powers like China and the United States dominate headlines in the South China Sea, nations like the Philippines find themselves on the frontline of a complex geopolitical chessboard.
For years, Manila relied on diplomatic negotiations through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to manage these disputes. However, as Chinese incursions grow more frequent and ASEAN’s efforts to mediate stall, the Philippines has begun exploring new ways to defend its territorial claims. No longer willing to depend solely on multilateral diplomacy, the Philippines is forging a new path: building smaller, targeted defense agreements—mini-lateral pacts—with regional allies like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan. This strategic shift marks a turning point in Philippine foreign policy, offering a more flexible and pragmatic approach to countering Chinese assertiveness in the region.
The Limits of ASEAN Diplomacy
For decades, ASEAN has served as the primary forum for addressing the South China Sea disputes, engaging China in negotiations to prevent conflict and establish a framework for dispute management. The goal has been to finalize a binding Code of Conduct (COC) that would establish rules for behavior in the contested waters. However, this process, which began in 2002, has moved at a glacial pace, and recent efforts to meet a 2026 deadline for the COC seem increasingly unattainable.
One of ASEAN’s core strengths—its commitment to consensus—has also been its greatest weakness in dealing with hard security issues. With its 10 member states each bringing diverse national interests and varying degrees of economic reliance on China, ASEAN has often struggled to present a unified front. Countries like Cambodia and Laos, for instance, have little incentive to challenge Beijing due to their close economic ties, while other non-claimant states have been less invested in the maritime dispute.
The Philippines, as one of the most prominent claimants, has been a staunch advocate for the COC and for peaceful resolution through multilateral channels. In 2024, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo reiterated the country’s commitment to the ASEAN process, calling the COC “a necessary mechanism for avoiding conflict.” Yet, with Beijing continuing to ignore key rulings, such as the 2016 arbitration decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which invalidated China’s sweeping claims in the South China Sea, optimism surrounding ASEAN-led negotiations has dimmed.
A New Foreign Policy Calculus
Frustrated by the slow progress within ASEAN, the Philippines has begun to look beyond the multilateral framework, recalibrating its foreign policy to include smaller, more focused defense arrangements. These mini-lateral agreements provide the Philippines with a more direct way to safeguard its interests in the South China Sea, avoiding the pitfalls of ASEAN’s consensus-based approach.
The most prominent of these mini-lateral partnerships has been with Vietnam, another major claimant in the South China Sea. In April 2024, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a strategic agreement to deepen defense cooperation, focusing on joint maritime patrols and intelligence sharing to counter Chinese activities in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This agreement builds on previous bilateral engagements, such as the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, and reflects both countries’ growing frustration with ASEAN’s inability to protect their maritime interests.
The deepening defense ties with Vietnam have already resulted in tangible outcomes. In June 2024, the Philippines and Vietnam conducted their first joint patrols in the South China Sea, focusing on monitoring Chinese militia vessels that had been operating near their claimed territories. Both countries also agreed to establish a direct communication line between their naval forces, similar to the hotline that exists between the U.S. and China, to reduce the risk of unintended clashes at sea. According to Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, “The joint patrols with Vietnam demonstrate our resolve to work with like-minded partners in upholding international law and safeguarding our territorial rights.”
Malaysia has also been a key partner in this mini-lateral approach. Despite traditionally taking a more cautious stance towards China, Malaysia has ramped up its defense cooperation with the Philippines in recent years, particularly in response to China’s incursions into its EEZ. In 2023, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim authorized an increase in naval patrols in the South China Sea, and in early 2024, the Philippines and Malaysia conducted joint naval exercises in the Sulu Sea, aimed at improving interoperability between their forces.
As Prime Minister Anwar stated during a visit to Manila in January 2024, “Our countries face common challenges in ensuring the security of our waters, and it is through closer defense cooperation that we will better safeguard our sovereign rights.”
Japan has also emerged as a key mini-lateral partner for the Philippines. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2024, Japan committed to providing advanced radar systems and patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard, bolstering Manila’s maritime domain awareness.
Japan’s involvement is part of its broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which aims to maintain stability and the rule of law in the region. Philippine-Japan cooperation has been further strengthened by the increasing presence of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels in the South China Sea, conducting joint exercises with the Philippine Navy.
Mini-laterals as a Strategic Anchor
Beyond immediate security concerns, mini-laterals serve a broader strategic purpose for the Philippines. They not only offer a practical mechanism for countering China’s activities but also provide a platform for building a more robust, rules-based maritime order in the region. By working with partners like Vietnam and Malaysia, the Philippines can strengthen its legal and diplomatic position, leveraging the 2016 Hague ruling and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to assert its rights.
The appeal of mini-lateral agreements lies in their potential to evolve into more comprehensive security networks. Over time, these smaller partnerships could coalesce into a larger, multilateral framework, creating a web of interlocking alliances that collectively contribute to regional stability. In this context, mini-laterals are not merely stopgap measures but building blocks for a more resilient Indo-Pacific security architecture.
The Philippines has also begun to diversify its security ties, looking beyond its traditional reliance on the United States. While the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty remains a cornerstone of the country’s defense strategy, the Philippines is increasingly engaging with other regional players. Recent agreements with Japan, Australia, and Singapore, for instance, reflect Manila’s desire to build a broader coalition of like-minded states, thereby reducing its dependence on Washington.
U.S. Support and Strategic Autonomy
Despite the Philippines’ growing focus on mini-laterals, its security alliance with the United States remains central to its defense strategy. Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the U.S. is obligated to come to the Philippines’ aid in the event of an armed attack. In 2023, the Marcos administration reaffirmed its commitment to the MDT, while also expanding the scope of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to allow for the pre-positioning of U.S. military assets in key Philippine bases, including those on Palawan, the province closest to the South China Sea.
The U.S. has consistently emphasized its support for the Philippines’ territorial claims and its opposition to China’s militarization of the South China Sea. In August 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “The United States stands with the Philippines in defending its rights under international law. We continue to call on China to comply with the 2016 arbitration ruling and refrain from provocative actions that threaten peace and stability.” As part of its ongoing efforts to strengthen deterrence, the U.S. conducted joint military exercises with the Philippines in March 2024, involving over 12,000 troops, in what was the largest Balikatan exercise to date.
However, balancing its traditional alliance with the U.S. and its mini-lateral initiatives presents a challenge for Philippine policymakers. While American military support is crucial for deterring Chinese aggression, Manila must also ensure that it does not become overly reliant on U.S. power. Over-reliance on Washington could complicate relations with ASEAN members who prefer a more neutral stance in the U.S.-China rivalry.
At the same time, analysts argue that the Philippines is wise to leverage its U.S. alliance while pursuing mini-lateral agreements. This approach allows Manila to enjoy the benefits of American deterrence while simultaneously building a network of regional partnerships that enhances its strategic autonomy. By doing so, the Philippines can create a more flexible and multifaceted foreign policy, positioning itself as both a U.S. ally and a key regional player.
Upholding International Law
The Philippines’ pivot toward mini-laterals is also deeply rooted in its commitment to upholding international law, particularly the 2016 PCA ruling and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The mini-lateral partnerships with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan are all framed within this legal context, with each country emphasizing the importance of a rules-based maritime order.
In April 2024, during a summit in Hanoi, President Marcos Jr. and Vietnamese President Võ Văn Thưởng issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to “promoting peace, security, and stability in the South China Sea, in line with international law, particularly UNCLOS.” Similarly, Japan’s FOIP strategy explicitly cites the 2016 PCA ruling, with Tokyo pledging to work with the Philippines and other regional actors to ensure that China abides by the rule of law.
While the road to a fully realized rules-based order in the South China Sea remains fraught with challenges, the Philippines’ engagement in mini-laterals represents a proactive step toward this goal. By building coalitions with like-minded states and emphasizing legal norms, the Philippines is positioning itself as a key player in the effort to enforce international law and maintain regional stability.
Such a move would send a strong signal to Beijing that the region’s smaller states are not willing to cede their rights, even in the absence of broader ASEAN support. Moreover, by anchoring its foreign policy in international law, the Philippines can maintain its moral high ground, attracting support from other nations and international organizations that value the rule of law.
The Philippines’ Leadership Role in ASEAN
As the Philippines prepares to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2026, it has a unique opportunity to shape the regional agenda on maritime security. While a binding COC with China may remain elusive, Manila can use its leadership role to advocate for greater security cooperation among ASEAN’s maritime states, encouraging its neighbors to pursue mini-lateral agreements as complementary tools to the broader ASEAN process.
The Philippines’ recent experience with mini-laterals could serve as a model for other claimant states, providing a template for more focused, results-oriented diplomacy. By promoting these smaller partnerships, the Philippines can help build a more cohesive regional security framework, one that aligns with ASEAN’s principles while addressing its limitations.
End Note: A New Strategic Path
The geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea is undergoing a fundamental transformation, and the Philippines is at the forefront of this change. As ASEAN negotiations with China remain stalled, Manila’s pivot toward mini-lateral defense agreements offers a pragmatic alternative for securing its interests and countering Chinese aggression. By forging closer ties with regional partners, the Philippines is not only enhancing its security but also contributing to the creation of a more resilient, rules-based maritime order.
In this new foreign policy era, the Philippines is charting a course that balances its long-standing alliance with the United States and its growing network of regional partnerships. This multi-tiered approach offers Manila greater flexibility, autonomy, and influence as it navigates the complex dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. While challenges remain, the Philippines’ strategic shift toward mini-laterals represents a bold step in safeguarding its sovereignty and shaping the future of regional security in the South China Sea.
