Philippines Defense Secretary Casts Doubt on F-16 Purchase
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, 2025, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro cast significant doubt on the long-speculated purchase of F-16 fighter jets from the United States. His remarks, reported on June 2–3, came in stark contrast to earlier momentum surrounding the deal. Teodoro firmly stated, “As far as I’m concerned, there’s nothing on the table for me to consider,” adding that no decision has been made on either the timing or the model for acquiring multi-role fighters. He dismissed reports of a pending purchase as mere “media hype,” signaling that the Philippines is still far from committing to the proposed deal.
Back in April 2025, the U.S. State Department approved a potential arms sale to the Philippines that included 20 F-16 fighter jets—specifically 16 F-16C and four F-16B Block 70/72 variants—along with missiles, bombs, and related systems. The total package was valued at $5.58 billion, just shy of the Philippines’ entire annual defense budget, which stands at approximately $6 billion. Given that this accounts for around 1.3% of the country’s GDP, the cost of acquiring the F-16s has raised questions of affordability and fiscal sustainability within the Philippine defense establishment.
Philippine Ambassador to the United States Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez echoed these concerns, describing the F-16s as more of an “aspiration” than an imminent reality. “We’re not closing the door on this,” he said, “but we need a structure that does not place too heavy a burden on our finances.” Romualdez emphasized that the Philippines is currently prioritizing land-based defense systems aligned with its evolving national security strategy. While talks are ongoing with Lockheed Martin to explore cost-effective pathways, officials have reiterated that more urgent defense needs must come first.
The broader geopolitical context remains tense. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned that the threat posed by China “could be imminent,” urging Indo-Pacific allies to bolster their defense spending. In this regard, Secretary Teodoro did not mince words about Beijing, saying, “China has a lot of trust building to do to be an effective negotiating partner” and that “we have to call a spade a spade.” While Manila remains closely aligned with Washington on security matters, including receiving $500 million in long-term U.S. military aid in 2024, it is proceeding cautiously when it comes to high-cost weapons acquisitions like the F-16s—seeking capability without compromising economic stability.
Globally, the F-16 remains a widely used platform, with over 3,100 units in service across 28 countries. However, for the Philippines, owning such advanced aircraft remains a long-term goal rather than a near-term commitment. For now, Manila’s defense trajectory favors more cost-effective systems that support its shift from internal security to external deterrence in a region increasingly shaped by great-power competition.
Details of the Potential F-16 Sale
In April 2025, the U.S. State Department formally approved a potential arms deal with the Philippines, signaling Washington’s willingness to enhance Manila’s airpower through the sale of advanced F-16 fighter jets. The proposed package includes 20 F-16s—specifically 16 F-16C Block 70/72 and four F-16D Block 70/72 aircraft—among the most modern variants of the iconic multirole fighter. These jets come equipped with cutting-edge capabilities such as the AN/APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a high-resolution Center Pedestal Display (CPD), and the Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS), which together significantly enhance survivability, situational awareness, and combat effectiveness.
Beyond the aircraft themselves, the deal is comprehensive, covering a full suite of weaponry, engines, and support systems. This includes 24 engines (20 installed, 4 spares), either the F110-GE-129D or F100-PW-229 depending on the jet variant. The package also features 22 AESA radars, 12 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods, and a large inventory of missiles and bombs. Notably, it includes 112 AIM-120C-8 AMRAAMs, 40 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinders with 32 captive training missiles, 36 GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, 60 MK-82 500-pound bombs, and 60 MK-84 2,000-pound general-purpose bombs. Additional assets include JDAM kits for precision guidance, M61A1 20mm cannons, missile launchers, secure communications, navigation systems, and logistical support equipment. The total estimated value of this extensive package is $5.58 billion.
However, the financial implications of this deal are immense for the Philippines. With an annual defense budget of approximately $6 billion—or about 1.3% of the country’s GDP, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—the proposed F-16 acquisition would consume nearly the entire annual military allocation. More specifically, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernization budget for 2025 highlights just how steep this purchase would be: only ₱35 billion (around $598 million USD) is guaranteed funding, as per the 2025 General Appropriations Act. An additional ₱40 billion ($684 million USD) falls under “unprogrammed appropriations,” which are conditional on surplus government revenues and therefore not assured.
As reported by Philstar.com on January 7, 2025, “Only ₱35 billion of the military’s ₱75 billion modernization budget for 2025 is guaranteed as actual funding… Meanwhile, ₱40 billion was lodged under unprogrammed appropriations, which are standby appropriations outside the approved government fiscal program that do not have definite funding sources.” This fiscal context underscores the daunting financial challenge of acquiring the F-16s, prompting Philippine officials to frame the jets more as a long-term aspiration than an immediate necessity. Without a sustainable funding structure or significant foreign financing assistance, the high cost of the deal remains a critical roadblock.
Context of U.S.-Philippines Alliance and China Tensions
The proposed F-16 sale must be understood within the broader geopolitical landscape of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and Washington’s renewed efforts to strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific. In March 2025, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Manila, meeting with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. His visit marked a significant moment in reaffirming the U.S.-Philippines alliance, as Teodoro publicly acknowledged Washington’s critical role in helping secure a partial waiver for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to aid the Philippines. “We are grateful for the enduring support of the United States,” Teodoro stated, emphasizing that this progress was achieved “in no small way through the efforts of Secretary Hegseth and the rest of the team.”
Two months later, during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, 2025, Secretary Hegseth delivered a stark warning about China’s growing military assertiveness. In his keynote speech, he bluntly stated, “We are not going to sugarcoat it — the threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent.” Hegseth accused Beijing of harassing Taiwan and preparing to use force to alter the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. “China seeks to intimidate you in your own waters,” he warned, making direct reference to China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and toward regional allies. His remarks sparked backlash from Beijing, with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accusing Hegseth of “inciting conflict and confrontation” and promoting a “cold war mentality.”
In his speech, Hegseth also urged U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific to ramp up their defense expenditures, calling for a commitment comparable to the 5% of GDP now expected from some NATO members. “We must all do our part,” he emphasized, asserting that, “Ultimately a strong, resolute, and capable network of allies and partners is our key strategic advantage. China envies what we have together… but it’s up to all of us to ensure we live up to that potential by investing.”
What If China Restricts Philippine Flights in the South China Sea?
From the Philippine perspective, the initial reaction to the proposed F-16 sale was generally positive. Some officials interpreted it as a clear signal of the United States’ long-term commitment to their defense, as well as a vote of confidence in the Philippine military’s capacity to operate and maintain such advanced aircraft. However, enthusiasm was tempered by practical concerns. Soon after the U.S. approval, a number of Philippine policymakers began to question whether such an expensive deal could be realistically funded without substantial American assistance.
Indeed, financial constraints quickly came to the forefront of public discourse. While the U.S. provided $500 million in long-term security aid to the Philippines in 2024—under the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act—sustaining that level of support would require new legislation from Congress. As Defense Secretary Teodoro noted, the reinstatement of this aid is crucial for “re-establishing effective deterrence against unwanted and malign influences that threaten stability — not just in the Indo-Pacific, but across the world.” However, without a firm congressional commitment to continued FMF support, the financial feasibility of purchasing the F-16s remains uncertain.
Further complicating the picture is the existing U.S.-Philippines defense planning framework. On July 29, 2024, during the Biden administration, both countries finalized the Philippines Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (P-SSAR), a long-term blueprint aimed at enhancing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard over the next five to ten years. The roadmap focuses primarily on maritime and coastal defense rather than on high-end fighter jets. It prioritizes assets such as air surveillance radars, coastal defense systems, drones, and military transport aircraft, all aimed at improving the Philippines’ maritime domain awareness across its vast archipelagic territory.
As described in the plan, it “largely consists of equipment to help survey and protect the Philippines’ vast coastlines,” a sentiment echoed by Philippine Ambassador to the United States Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez. “We’re really looking at other items that are, in view of our national defense strategy, more important than the F-16s,” he said, adding that cheaper land-based systems are currently a more realistic priority. While F-16s may be considered as “priority defense platforms” in the long run, they are not an immediate focus of the roadmap, which underscores the Philippine government’s current emphasis on defending its maritime territory against Chinese encroachments.
Together, these dynamics illustrate the delicate balance Manila must strike: pursuing strategic modernization to counter regional threats, affirming alliance commitments with the U.S., and doing so within the severe financial limits of its current defense budget. The F-16 proposal is therefore more than just a weapons sale—it’s a litmus test of how deeply the U.S.-Philippines alliance can be transformed in an era of mounting regional insecurity and escalating superpower competition.
Philippines-China Tensions at the Shangri-La Dialogue
Teodoro’s exchange with Chinese delegates: At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. found himself at the center of a sharp and unusually confrontational exchange with representatives of the Chinese military. During a high-stakes panel discussion on June 1, two senior colonels from China’s People’s Liberation Army National Defense University—Senior Colonel Qi Dapeng and Senior Colonel Zhang Chi—openly challenged the Philippines’ close alignment with the United States. Senior Colonel Qi questioned why the Philippines could not follow Malaysia’s example, referencing Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s call for dialogue and diplomacy with Beijing. In a veiled accusation, Qi asked whether Manila intended to act as “a proxy for external powers.” Meanwhile, Colonel Zhang warned of a growing U.S. military footprint in the region and provocatively asked if Secretary Teodoro was concerned that “a proxy war in Asia might be launched.”
Teodoro’s response was swift and unapologetic. Brushing aside the insinuations, he publicly accused Beijing of dispatching “pretend journalists”—implying intelligence agents in disguise—rather than sending actual high-ranking defense officials to the forum. In a moment that drew applause and laughter from the audience, Teodoro responded to the line of questioning with pointed sarcasm: “Thank you for the propaganda spiels disguised as questions.”
He then doubled down, defending the Philippines’ sovereign right to chart its own course independent of Chinese or American influence. “Let us not forget,” he declared, “that while we are members of ASEAN, we are sovereign countries, each with its own territorial integrity and sovereignty. And I’m sure that if what China is doing to the Philippines is done to Malaysia or to any ASEAN country, you would see a different reaction.”
Crucially, Teodoro pushed back against the notion that the Philippines’ stance in the South China Sea was a mere reflection of great power rivalry. “The Philippine position on the West Philippine Sea is not a function of Sino-American strategic rivalry,” he asserted. “Instead, it is caused, no doubt, by the overreach of the Chinese Communist Party—of which the most glaring evidence is the nine, 10, or 11-line that has absolutely no basis in international law.”
South China Sea disputes
Tensions in the South China Sea continue to intensify as Chinese maritime forces persist in harassing Philippine vessels operating within the country’s exclusive economic zone. These incidents, which have become disturbingly routine, reflect a sustained campaign of coercion by Beijing to assert control over disputed waters—particularly near the contested Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
The latest flashpoint occurred on May 22, 2025, when the Philippines accused the China Coast Guard of firing water cannons and sideswiping the BRP Datu Sanday, a government research vessel, during a marine scientific expedition near Sandy Cay. The attack resulted in visible damage to the vessel’s port bow and smokestack. This marked a dangerous escalation, as it was the first time Chinese forces used water cannons against a Philippine vessel in the Sandy Cay area—an area long claimed and patrolled by Manila.
Just a month earlier, in April 2025, another alarming confrontation took place near Scarborough Shoal, where a China Coast Guard vessel attempted to ram the Philippine Coast Guard’s BRP Cabra. The Philippine Coast Guard later released video footage capturing the aggressive Chinese maneuvers, further underscoring the increasingly hazardous nature of these maritime encounters.
This pattern of harassment extends back to the beginning of the year. In January 2025, Philippine authorities were forced to suspend a scientific survey mission near Sandy Cay after their fisheries vessels were shadowed and harassed by three Chinese Coast Guard ships and a helicopter from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The threat of escalation led to the withdrawal of Philippine crews from the area, highlighting the real danger faced by even non-military missions.
Most recently, in early May 2025, Chinese military and maritime assets—including the PLAN 054A frigates Tongliao and Liuzhou, along with a China Coast Guard cutter—harassed the Philippine Navy’s BRP Emilio Jacinto while it was conducting a routine patrol near Scarborough Shoal. The persistent pressure from both the Chinese Coast Guard and PLAN units has dramatically raised the stakes in these already fraught waters.
In response to these incidents, the Armed Forces of the Philippines issued a strongly worded statement condemning Beijing’s actions. “The Armed Forces of the Philippines expresses its serious concern over these irresponsible actions by Chinese maritime forces,” the statement read. “Such threatening and provocative conduct can lead to [a] misunderstanding that may escalate tensions and impact regional stability.”
These repeated confrontations reflect a deliberate strategy by China to assert de facto control over areas well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, using both civilian and military assets to blur the lines between maritime law enforcement and military coercion. For Manila, these actions are more than just provocations—they are direct threats to its sovereignty, maritime rights, and regional peace.
Beijing claims the South China Sea despite 2016 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruling
At the heart of the South China Sea conflict lies Beijing’s sweeping territorial claim, which asserts sovereignty over nearly the entire sea through its controversial “nine-dash line”—a cartographic invention that cuts deeply into the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and even Taiwan. In recent years, Philippine officials have referred to this claim as a “10-dash” or “11-dash line” to emphasize its shifting and arbitrary nature.
China’s assertions were dealt a major blow on July 12, 2016, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague delivered a landmark ruling in favor of the Philippines. The tribunal concluded that China’s expansive maritime claims under the nine-dash line had no legal foundation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It further ruled that several contested maritime features, including Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, are within the Philippines’ EEZ and cannot be lawfully claimed by Beijing.
Despite the clarity and authority of the decision, China has rejected the ruling outright, calling it “null and void” and asserting that it has no binding effect. This outright dismissal of international legal norms has been matched by China’s actions on the ground—or more accurately, at sea. In the years since the ruling, Beijing has accelerated its efforts to assert control over the disputed waters through aggressive land reclamation, the construction of artificial islands, and the militarization of key features.
This blatant defiance of international law underscores a larger pattern in China’s regional strategy: to assert dominance through might while disregarding multilateral rules and legal mechanisms. For countries like the Philippines, the issue is no longer just about territorial disputes—it is about defending the rules-based international order in the face of coercive expansionism.
Second Thomas Shoal Resupply Mission: Did Manila Ask Beijing?
Teodoro’s strong statement on China
In one of the most candid assessments of China by a Southeast Asian defense leader in recent memory, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. delivered a blistering critique of Beijing’s behavior and credibility as a negotiating partner. Speaking on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Teodoro emphasized that any meaningful dialogue with China remains elusive—not because of a lack of diplomacy, but due to a fundamental absence of trust.
“For dialogue to be effective, it must be coupled with trust,” he asserted. “That is the biggest stumbling block to dispute resolution or dialogue with China.” He further emphasized the universality of this perception, noting, “That deficit of trust, which I think any rational person – or any person that is not ideologically biased, with freedom of thought and freedom of speech – will agree with.”
Teodoro didn’t stop at diplomatic language. He took a direct shot at the broader vision China claims to offer the world. “To envision a China-led international order, we only need to look at how they treat their much smaller neighbors in the South China Sea,” he said. “It runs counter to the ‘peaceful rise’ they initially promised.” The gap between China’s rhetoric and reality, in Teodoro’s view, is not just wide—it is alarming.
Taking a principled stand, Teodoro declared that he simply cannot trust a government that “represses its own people.” He framed China not just as a geopolitical challenge, but as the Philippines’ foremost threat: “For us, our biggest threat is China. And on that, we converge not only with the United States but with other countries.”
By calling a spade a spade, Secretary Teodoro signaled a sharp pivot in Manila’s tone—one that aligns with a growing chorus of regional voices pushing back against Chinese coercion and highlighting the central role of trust, transparency, and respect for sovereignty in building peace.
