As the Philippines ‘Bristles’ with Missiles, Is It a Deterrent or a Dangerous Escalation?
Once heavily reliant on the United States for its defense, the Philippines is now entering a new era of military capability—armed with a growing missile arsenal sourced from key allies like the U.S., Israel, South Korea, France, and India. This transformation, dramatically showcased during the 2025 Balikatan military exercises, signals a shift in Manila’s defense posture: from internal security and counterinsurgency to external deterrence. But this newfound firepower has sparked a deeper strategic question—does it act as a vital deterrent, or is it a provocative move that risks destabilizing the region?
At the 2025 Balikatan drills, Filipino troops demonstrated a range of missiles: French-made Mistral 3s launched from Navy frigates, Israeli Spike missiles fired from fast-attack boats, and South Korean C-Star anti-ship weapons. American Marines also rolled out the NMESIS system in the Luzon Strait—an area of increasing strategic significance due to its proximity to Taiwan. Following these drills, Manila has expressed interest in acquiring such advanced platforms for its own inventory.
This missile revolution is a sharp departure from the past. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had no missile capability until 2018, when it conducted its first-ever test with the Israeli Spike-ER. Fast forward to today, and the AFP is steadily building a sophisticated arsenal. The crown jewel of this effort is the Indian-made BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, deployed with the Philippine Marines for coastal defense. With a 300-kilometer range and Mach 2.8 speed, the BrahMos is regarded as a regional game-changer—one of the few systems in Southeast Asia capable of credibly threatening Chinese naval forces.
American systems have also entered the mix. After Balikatan 2023, the Philippines voiced interest in the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System). By 2024, the U.S. had stationed its Typhon missile system in northern Luzon. Though originally a temporary deployment, Manila has requested its extension and is now exploring a potential purchase. The Typhon system’s multi-missile versatility—capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 interceptors—would significantly enhance the country’s strike range and deterrence capability in the broader Indo-Pacific.
However, not everyone is convinced that this military build-up improves Philippine security. “We are bristling with U.S. and foreign missiles aimed at China, Russia, and North Korea—nations with massive retaliatory capabilities,” warned Professor Roland Simbulan of the Centre for People Empowerment in Governance. He argues that EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) sites, which host prepositioned U.S. assets, could make the Philippines a primary target in any major conflict. “It’s a nerve-breaking situation,” Simbulan added.
Yet defense analysts contend that Manila is merely playing catch-up in a region where missile systems are becoming standard tools of statecraft. Defense consultant Max Montero dismisses China’s criticisms as disingenuous, noting that Beijing itself wields overwhelming firepower, including nuclear weapons. “The Philippines is just keeping pace,” he said. “We still lag in fighter aircraft, logistics, and radar—but these missiles are a good start.” Indeed, only Vietnam, among ASEAN states, has fielded a system comparable to the BrahMos.
Historically, the country’s military was not designed for external threats. For most of the 20th century, the Philippines relied on U.S. military bases for protection, while the AFP focused on counterinsurgency against communist rebels and separatist movements. A half-hearted missile project in the 1970s, mockingly dubbed “Bongbong 1” under dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., fizzled out in failure. But that all changed after 2012, when China seized control of Scarborough Shoal. The incident jolted Manila into launching a serious military modernization program under then-President Benigno Aquino III, signaling a strategic pivot toward external defense.
Despite this progress, the Philippines’ capabilities remain modest compared to China’s vast arsenal of advanced and even hypersonic missile systems. Still, the symbolic and strategic impact of possessing the BrahMos—and potentially the Typhon—cannot be understated. “It’s a message: we’re no longer defenseless,” Montero noted.
Critics like Simbulan remain unconvinced. He advocates for a purely defensive posture—favoring systems like Patriot batteries or South Korea’s THAAD missile shield under full Philippine control, rather than offensive platforms prepositioned by foreign militaries. “Defensive deterrence, not provocation, should be our posture,” he argued.
Others see things differently. Professor Alessio Patalano of King’s College London considers the current missile acquisitions to be measured and justified. “These capabilities are not destabilizing in themselves,” he explained. “They are part of a logical response to Chinese military developments that have been unfolding in plain view for years. While these changes may be disadvantageous for China, they are not inherently escalatory.”
Ultimately, the Philippines’ deepening missile partnerships and defense modernization raise an unavoidable question: will these new capabilities act as a protective shield that deters aggression—or will they ignite the very conflict they aim to prevent? What is clear, however, is that the era of a lightly armed Philippines in the face of growing regional threats is rapidly drawing to a close. The country is no longer sitting on the sidelines—it is now preparing, visibly and deliberately, to defend its place in a contested Indo-Pacific.

Background: The Philippines Enters the Missile Age:

The Philippines’ entry into the missile age is a relatively recent but dramatic shift in its defense posture. Until 2018, the country had never conducted a formal missile test—the Rafael Spike-ER, sourced from Israel, marked its first foray into precision-guided weaponry. Since then, Manila has been actively diversifying its missile portfolio, acquiring systems from the United States, Israel, South Korea, France, and notably, India. These include a mix of man-portable air-defense systems (like the French Mistral 3), anti-ship cruise missiles (such as the Korean C-Star), and land-based missile batteries, including the highly publicized BrahMos system. The BrahMos acquisition, finalized in 2022 for $375 million and partially delivered in 2024, is seen as a “game changer” in enhancing deterrence in the South China Sea. Further deliveries are expected, which could raise the total value significantly.
Driving this transformation is a growing financial commitment to military modernization. While exact figures for missile acquisitions are not always disclosed, defense budgets reflect this broader trend. The 2024 national budget allocated PHP 282.7 billion (about USD 5 billion) to defense—around 4.9% of the total budget—marking a clear prioritization of military upgrades (DBM, Aug 2023). This includes not only current acquisitions but future plans, such as potential deals for the US-made HIMARS rocket artillery system and the more advanced Typhon missile system. HIMARS units are estimated to cost $5–6 million each, while the Typhon system, still under development and testing, would require a substantially larger investment. These prospective acquisitions signal the Philippines’ ambition to develop a credible, modern, and responsive missile force.
The Philippines’ strategy mirrors the defense trajectories of other nations in contested regions. Israel, for example, has developed and fielded a wide range of missile systems suited to asymmetric warfare and territorial defense—many of which the Philippines is now adopting. South Korea’s transformation into a defense exporter also offers a roadmap, with Manila purchasing its C-Star missiles as part of a growing regional trend of arms diversification. But perhaps the most significant parallel lies with India, whose BrahMos missile has placed it squarely in the Philippines’ strategic arsenal. As the first export customer of this supersonic cruise missile, the Philippines’ decision underscores a tactical shift: from internal counterinsurgency to coastal and maritime deterrence against powerful state actors in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

 Concerns and Criticisms:

The Philippines’ growing missile arsenal, while aimed at strengthening territorial defense, has sparked serious concerns among both domestic analysts and foreign powers. Professor Roland Simbulan, a respected geopolitical scholar, warns that the country is becoming a potential target for strategic rivals such as China, Russia, and North Korea due to its increasing reliance on foreign-made missile systems—particularly those deployed under U.S. military cooperation. His caution reflects a broader unease that hosting or acquiring systems like the U.S. Typhon may draw retaliatory attention, especially from powers that view such deployments as extensions of American encirclement strategies. As he bluntly put it, “Chinese counter-missiles are locked on fixed US launchers that are land-based on EDCA sites” (SCMP, May 18, 2025).
China’s reaction has been especially vocal and accusatory. In response to Manila’s plans to acquire the Typhon system, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning condemned the move as “extremely irresponsible,” arguing it endangers not only the Filipino people but also the broader Southeast Asian region. While Beijing officially frames its growing military presence in the South China Sea as defensive and within its sovereign rights, the Philippines’ missile modernization is likely seen in China as both a challenge to its maritime claims and a deepening of U.S.-led containment efforts. This narrative fits into a broader geopolitical context where military build-ups—even those framed as defensive—can be perceived as threats by rival powers, leading to a destabilizing arms race dynamic in contested regions like the South China Sea.
Historical and contemporary precedents reinforce these concerns. The deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea, for example, provoked severe Chinese backlash, including economic retaliation—highlighting how regional powers react to perceived encroachments on their strategic buffer zones. Similarly, the Cuban Missile Crisis serves as a stark reminder of how missile placements near rival borders can provoke intense escalation, even among nuclear-armed states. Meanwhile, Russia’s aggressive stance on NATO expansion illustrates how major powers interpret military alliances and foreign weapons systems near their periphery as existential threats. Against this backdrop, the Philippines’ tilt toward missile-based deterrence, while understandable, must navigate a precarious path—one that enhances national defense without inadvertently accelerating regional instability.

The Potential Acquisition of Cheap Italian fighter Jets by the Philippines

 The Deterrence Argument:

Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, Filipino-Australian defense consultant Max Montero argues that the Philippines’ acquisition of missile systems like the U.S.-made Typhon is not an act of provocation, but a long-overdue step toward military modernization. “The Philippines is merely catching up with the times and with the neighbourhood,” Montero asserts, highlighting that Manila’s actions are reactive—not aggressive—in a region where China has maintained a commanding lead in military strength for decades. According to the 2025 Global Firepower Index, China ranks 3rd globally in military power, while the Philippines stands at 55th. This vast gap underscores Montero’s contention that China’s outrage is exaggerated given its overwhelming advantage, including nuclear capabilities. From his view, it’s not only logical but necessary for the Philippines to strengthen its deterrent posture to avoid becoming an easy target.
Deterrence, Montero argues, hinges not just on weapons but on partnerships—and the Philippines is leaning into its alliances with the United States, Japan, and Australia to project a credible defensive stance. As he puts it, “Our defence may involve the participation of our US ally and other regional partners like Japan and Australia.” This is backed by the increasing scale and sophistication of joint military exercises like Balikatan, which now involve thousands of troops and advanced warfighting simulations. These drills serve both as preparation and signal—reminding potential aggressors that an attack on the Philippines could invite a wider regional response. This approach mirrors successful deterrence strategies seen elsewhere, from South Korea’s alignment with the U.S. against North Korea, to Taiwan’s asymmetric buildup in the face of Chinese threats.
Historical parallels lend further credibility to this strategy. During the Cold War, NATO successfully deterred Soviet aggression through the principle of collective defense—where even smaller member states were protected under a shared military umbrella. Similarly, the Philippines’ reliance on its Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S., and growing cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies, reflects a modern adaptation of this Cold War logic. Rather than engaging in an arms race, the goal is to raise the cost of any potential aggression so high that adversaries like China are forced to think twice. Ultimately, Montero’s position reframes the missile acquisition not as a reckless gamble, but as a rational step in building a layered, alliance-backed deterrence posture suited to the 21st-century security landscape.

 Historical Context: Dependence on the US:

For nearly five decades following World War II, the Philippines leaned heavily on the United States for its external defense, hosting major American military installations like Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. This long-standing arrangement shaped the country’s strategic mindset: while the U.S. provided a security umbrella against foreign threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) focused almost exclusively on domestic challenges—particularly communist insurgencies and separatist movements. As Professor Roland Simbulan put it, “The AFP was focused on an internal threat, thus its weapons were for counter-insurgency. We relied entirely on the US for external defence.” This dependency delayed the Philippines’ entry into the missile age and left its external defense capabilities underdeveloped well into the 21st century.
Attempts to break this mold came early but often fell short. One of the most symbolic failures was the ill-fated “Bongbong 1” missile project in the 1970s, which Simbulan described as more farce than force: “It became a joke because it was really a kwitis (firework). After one test firing, the project was called off.” Even the AFP Modernization Act of 1995, passed after the U.S. bases closed in 1992, struggled to gain traction due to budgetary constraints and political disinterest. The bulk of defense spending still went to internal security, reflecting a strategic inertia rooted in the Cold War era. This pattern wasn’t unique to the Philippines—many Southeast Asian nations emerging from colonial rule similarly prioritized internal stability over external deterrence.
The wake-up call came in 2012 with China’s assertive takeover of Scarborough Shoal, which exposed the Philippines’ stark vulnerability at sea. “Upon assuming office in 2010, President Benigno Aquino announced his intention to modernize the AFP, to buttress the country’s territorial defense, and to check China’s aggressive assertion of its sovereignty over the South China Sea,” a defense analysis notes. This marked a decisive pivot in the Philippines’ strategic outlook—from internal threats to external defense. The Scarborough standoff not only reinvigorated modernization efforts but also reoriented the Philippines’ security doctrine toward defending its maritime boundaries. This shift continues to shape policy today, as the country seeks to balance its legacy of dependency with the need for credible self-defense in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region.

Philippines’ New Spy Jet Leaves Chinese Y-8 Spy Plane in the Dust

Current Capabilities and Comparisons:

The Philippines has made meaningful strides in upgrading its military, particularly with recent missile acquisitions that have brought it into the modern age of regional deterrence. Yet, as defense analyst Max Montero candidly notes, “While we suddenly found ourselves in the missile age, we are still lacking in many aspects, including capacity and quantity.” Compared to regional peers, the Philippine military remains modest in both scale and technological diversity. According to the 2025 Global Firepower Index, the country ranks 41st globally—well behind Indonesia at 13th—reflecting broader disparities in defense spending, manpower, and logistical infrastructure. Despite the headlines, the Philippines is still in the early phases of building a credible, layered defense posture.
That said, there are notable bright spots. The acquisition of the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile system from India is a significant leap forward. It marks the Philippines as the first export customer for this powerful platform, placing it alongside Vietnam, which fields a comparable system—the Russian-made Bastion-P. “The BrahMos land-based anti-ship missile is a game changer,” says Montero, underscoring its strategic value for maritime defense. Additionally, while the Philippine air defense system is assessed to be more advanced than Malaysia’s, Kuala Lumpur still holds the edge in airpower. The Royal Malaysian Air Force operates a more diversified fleet, including 18 Su-30MKM fighters and is acquiring 18 newer FA-50 Block 20 aircraft equipped with advanced AESA radars and expanded missile loadouts. The Philippines, by contrast, fields only 12 FA-50s with limited strike and air-to-air capabilities.
Yet the regional benchmark isn’t Malaysia or Vietnam—it’s China. And here, the asymmetry is stark. “China’s missile technology greatly exceeds the Philippines,” President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. admitted earlier this year. That’s not just diplomatic modesty—it’s strategic reality. China is projected to field up to 4,000 Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) by 2035, part of a missile development program that includes advanced systems like the DF-ZF and YJ-21. These weapons represent not only a qualitative leap but also a direct challenge to the survivability of conventional air defenses across the region. While the Philippines is no longer defenseless, it remains in the shadow of a regional giant whose missile arsenal is among the most advanced and expansive in the world.

Differing Perspectives on Impact:

The Philippines’ recent missile acquisitions have sparked a vibrant debate among defense experts and regional analysts. Alessio Patalano of King’s College London tempers the excitement by cautioning that it’s “premature to suggest that [the Philippines] now ‘bristles’ with missiles.” He emphasizes that capability-building is a long-term endeavor requiring sustained investment. However, Patalano also recognizes these developments as a rational and necessary deterrent response to China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region. In contrast, Professor Roland Simbulan argues that such offensive weaponry risks provoking adversaries and destabilizing the region, urging instead for purely defensive systems like the Patriot or THAAD—strictly controlled by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Countering Simbulan’s concerns, analysts like Max Montero underscore the deterrent logic behind these acquisitions. Montero asserts that the ability to inflict significant damage—such as sinking Chinese naval vessels—serves a preventive function by making Beijing think twice before initiating conflict. This debate reflects a broader tension in military strategy: can deterrence through strength prevent war, or does it risk escalating tensions further? Patalano adds that while these missile deployments are disadvantageous for China, they are not inherently destabilizing, especially if viewed as reactive rather than provocative. It’s a fine line, but one many nations in the Indo-Pacific are beginning to walk.
Quantifying the direct impact of missile deployments on regional stability remains challenging, but indicators offer context. Military spending across Southeast Asia continues to rise, signaling either a slow-burning arms race or collective responses to growing external threats. Public opinion also leans toward stronger defense postures, with a 2024 survey showing widespread Filipino concern over China’s actions in the South China Sea. Historical case studies—from NATO’s Cold War missile deployments to India-Pakistan’s deterrence equilibrium—highlight the complex and often paradoxical nature of missile strategy: it can either stabilize through fear of retaliation or destabilize by triggering preemptive responses. The Philippines, now equipped with BrahMos missiles, is entering this arena with cautious optimism—and the watchful eyes of both allies and rivals.