In 2012, the United Nations recognized Benham Rise, located off the east coast of the Philippines, as part of the country’s extended continental shelf. This recognition was uncontested by China. Fast forward to today, the Philippines has submitted a new claim to the United Nations for an extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea—a region marked by increasingly hostile maritime conflicts with China. Marshall Louis Alferez, the foreign ministry’s assistant secretary for maritime and ocean affairs, emphasized the importance of securing the Philippines’ future by asserting their exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources within their ECS entitlement. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea overlap with territories claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China’s claims, Beijing continues to dispute this decision. The recent UN submission by the Philippines aims to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, extending up to 350 nautical miles.
Let’s get into the detail of it.
Rising Tensions between China and Philippines in the South China Sea
Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the hazards of armed conflict in the South China Sea. The region is embroiled in complex sovereignty disputes involving multiple countries with competing claims over various features and maritime entitlements. However, recent incidents between Beijing and Manila have raised the most significant concerns. The Philippines maintains nine outposts in the Spratly Islands, a contentious cluster of land and sea features at the heart of the South China Sea. One such outpost, Second Thomas Shoal, has become a perilous flashpoint. Here, Chinese vessels continually attempt to obstruct Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship deliberately grounded by a former Philippine government in 1999 to assert sovereignty over the atoll. Although China also claims the shoal, it began interfering with these resupply missions in 2014. Relations have reached unprecedented turbulence over the past several months, with Chinese ships repeatedly assaulting Philippine supply vessels and deploying water cannons, injuring sailors.
The South China Sea has thus become a hotspot for potential conflict, with Washington and Beijing at odds. This tension prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to challenge China’s territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Manila, invalidating China’s claim to waters within its “nine-dash line,” which roughly encompasses the entire South China Sea. However, Beijing dismissed the ruling and undermined efforts to resolve the dispute legally by constructing and fortifying artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was pending. This move significantly altered the status quo, enabling Beijing to establish permanent garrisons in the area.
A brief lull in the maritime dispute occurred after Rodrigo Duterte succeeded Aquino in 2016. Duterte adopted a pragmatic approach towards Beijing, downplaying the tribunal’s ruling and seeking economic benefits from China. Despite his efforts, tensions at sea persisted, with regular standoffs between the Philippine coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fishermen struggled to access their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the valuable oil and gas reserves within its exclusive economic zone, as recognized under international law. In March 2021, the situation escalated when Chinese ships amassed on Whitsun Reef, an uninhabited feature in the sea, prompting senior Philippine officials to publicly criticize China’s actions for the first time in years. By the end of Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines had renewed ties with the United States and filed numerous diplomatic protests against China.
Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who succeeded Duterte in 2022, initially sought to maintain friendly relations with Beijing. However, this relationship soured within months. Despite China being the Philippines’ largest trading partner, Marcos Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping failed to yield significant new investments or curb China’s aggressive “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea. These setbacks led Marcos Jr. to strengthen ties with Washington, with the Biden administration repeatedly affirming that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft, or government vessels.
West has traditionally advocated for the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, emphasizing adherence to international law while avoiding taking sides. However, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have prompted a shift in European perspectives. The EU and several member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies to enhance cooperation with regional countries. Brussels has also increased diplomatic support for the Philippines, issuing supportive statements following maritime altercations. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first visit by a Commission President, to express the EU’s readiness to enhance maritime security cooperation.
Background on the ECS Claim
The process of filing a claim before the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) involves several critical steps. Initially, a coastal state conducts comprehensive scientific and technical studies to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. These studies rely on geological, geomorphological, and geophysical data. Upon completion of these studies, the state prepares a detailed submission, which includes charts and coordinates, for review by the CLCS. The commission then examines the data, may request additional information, and, if the submission meets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requirements, provides recommendations. These recommendations form the basis for the coastal state’s establishment of the outer limits of its continental shelf, which are final and binding.
As the world’s coastal states divide up the ocean floor, the CLCS’s work becomes increasingly vital. The “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Law and Legitimacy” examines the Commission from two perspectives: a legal examination of its decision-making process and a study of its normative legitimacy. The CLCS exists to facilitate the implementation of UNCLOS in establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state must set the outer boundaries of its continental shelf where it exceeds 200 nautical miles, based on the Commission’s advice. The Commission offers recommendations to coastal states on creating such limits. However, its recommendations and actions do not affect the delimitation of boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.
Territorial and maritime sovereignty
There are two major points of contention: territorial sovereignty and maritime sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty conflicts concern claims of lawful possession of the territory itself, often relying on historical presence to determine rightful control. Maritime boundary conflicts pertain to the territorial delimitations permitted by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
UNCLOS established a 12-nautical-mile territorial sovereignty limit from a country’s coastline and a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that covers seabed resources within that sphere from the shoreline. This is significant because the country with authority over the islands also controls the natural resources in the surrounding area. In the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) territorial disputes, there have been no fundamental resolutions of territorial sovereignty or marine boundary delimitations acceptable to all parties involved. Competing sovereignty claims stem from fundamentally different views on historical ownership rights, making convergence and reconciliation difficult to achieve.
The potentially rich natural resources in the claimed EEZs are central to the territorial disputes. Regarding maritime delimitation, scholars like Mark J. Valencia and Unryu Suganuma have noted that joint resource development can help build cooperative frameworks between the claimants, potentially leading to a more institutionalized method of energy resource distribution in the long run. Advancing resource cooperation in areas where China does not have administrative control over some disputed islands (such as the Spratly Islands and Senkaku Diaoyu Islands) can be a practical way to progress without acknowledging the other party’s sovereignty claims. Deng Xiaoping considered the “shelving” policy of collaboration as realistic for mutual economic gains while not jeopardizing China’s sovereignty claims. In the Senkaku Diaoyu conflict, there has been some progress in bilateral resource development, including a fisheries deal in 1997 and an agreement to develop the Shirakaba Chunxiao oil field in 2008. Long-term cooperative development activities are likely to be the most realistic and beneficial for creating trust and promoting positive-sum gains. Southeast Asian countries will likely choose regional security cooperation from powers like the United States and Japan in the foreseeable future. Establishing trust and providing comfort in bilateral interactions, both verbally and in action, will be critical in breaking the “suspicion begetting suspicion” and “fear begetting fear” cycles. Formalizing collaborative development frameworks will be essential for the SCS and ECS islands due to their geopolitical significance and will be a crucial determinant of future cooperation.
Securing maritime entitlements and resources through this process is highly significant for coastal states. It allows to exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, including valuable hydrocarbons, minerals, and biological resources. Establishing clear maritime boundaries also helps prevent conflicts with neighboring states and ensures that the coastal state can manage and exploit its marine resources sustainably. Furthermore, it strengthens the state’s legal and political standing in asserting its maritime claims, contributing to regional stability and fostering economic development.
Article 76 of UNCLOS provides the legal basis for coastal states to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their baselines. According to this article, a coastal state can extend its continental shelf if it meets specific geological criteria, including the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or a distance of up to 350 nautical miles from the baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, whichever is greater. Coastal states must submit scientific and technical data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for validation.
The 2016 Arbitral Award, issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS, affirmed the Philippines’ maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. The tribunal ruled that China’s claims based on the “nine-dash line” had no legal basis under UNCLOS and clarified the entitlements of the Philippines within its EEZ and continental shelf. This award strengthens the Philippines’ legal standing and supports its claims for an extended continental shelf under UNCLOS provisions.
China Rejects Philippines’ Attempt to Extend Continental Shelf in South China Sea
China has rejected the Philippines’ request to seek UN approval for extending its continental shelf in the South China Sea, aiming to secure “exclusive” rights to exploit underwater resources. “The Philippines unilaterally submitted a case regarding the delimitation of the outer continental shelf in the South China Sea, infringing upon China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian.
Beijing claims a vast ocean territory under its “nine-dash line,” which extends hundreds of miles south and east from Hainan Province. However, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 that this claim has no legal basis under international law. Despite this ruling, China has rejected the verdict and has been in talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 2002 to establish a code of conduct in the contested sea.
The Philippines submitted a request to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to determine the extent of its underwater continental shelf in the West Palawan Region facing the South China Sea. “The seabed and subsoil extending from our archipelago up to the maximum extent allowed by UNCLOS hold significant potential resources that will benefit our nation and people for generations to come,” said Philippine Foreign Assistant Secretary Marshall Louis Alferez. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants a coastal state exclusive rights to utilize natural resources on the continental shelf. Beijing strongly opposes the Philippines’ move, urging the panel not to investigate Manila’s submission as it covers disputed maritime space.
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the commission should not evaluate or qualify the Philippines’ proposal if it includes the delimitation of disputed waters, following CLCS’s norms of procedure. Lin indicated that Beijing is still gathering information, but views Manila’s “unilateral submission” as a violation of China’s sovereign rights. Maritime affairs experts agree, predicting that Manila’s petition is unlikely to succeed and that Beijing will perceive the move as a legal challenge exacerbating South China Sea tensions. “It seems unlikely that CLCS will be able to validate any such claim. the Commission has, as a rule, avoided making any delimitation decisions when there are outstanding jurisdictional or sovereignty disputes,” said Isaac Kardon, senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Beijing would see the claim as “another legal and political challenge from Manila,” similar to the 2016 arbitration, and as an attempt to undermine China’s broad claims through a UN institutional approach, he added.
China’s Foreign Ministry said it is still gathering information regarding Manila’s “unilateral submission” of an enlarged continental shelf. Mainland China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, which includes territory claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. While the specifics of Manila’s submission had not yet been made public, its continental shelf claims might overlap with those of other coastal governments in the South China Sea, potentially leading other claimant states to use similar techniques. “The Philippines’ submission could set a precedent for other claimant states, who may file similar ECS (extended continental shelf) submissions to assert their rights,” said Ding Duo, associate research fellow at Hainan’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies. He noted that claimant countries might file their applications alone or together, adding that either scenario would complicate the South China Sea conflicts.
“This will make the dispute even more complex and harder to resolve, and introduces a new point of contention for how Beijing and Manila should properly manage and handle their differences in the South China Sea,” Ding told the press.
Maritime observers believed that Beijing would respond to Manila with harsh operational and diplomatic actions. “China might also increase the intensity of their interdictions at Second Thomas Shoal or escalate elsewhere in the South China Sea against Philippine interests,” Carnegie’s Kardon said, adding that China might choose to publish baselines around the Spratlys to challenge the Philippines’ claims. Baselines are essential in determining marine boundaries and exerting control over resources since they serve as the starting point for measuring a country’s territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf.
The Philippines Dilemma: How to manage tensions in the SCS?
The Philippines is a significant actor in the South China Sea territorial disputes, which are intensifying as China asserts itself and claimant governments compete for resources. Rather than using international law to counter China’s claims, President Rodrigo Duterte has taken a pragmatic approach, avoiding confrontation in hopes of reaping economic benefits. However, five years later, it appears this strategy has not fully paid off. The simmering maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing has become more entangled with geopolitical competition between China and the United States and its allies. Given the increased potential for escalating events at sea, Manila should advocate for a substantive and effective Code of Conduct between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to control maritime tensions while maintaining diplomatic channels with Beijing to avoid misunderstandings. Additionally, promoting regional collaboration, such as in fisheries management, would be beneficial.
Duterte, eager to reduce ties with the United States and extend his strategic options, has minimized the question of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea during his administration, focusing instead on economic gains from China. In line with this strategy, he downplayed Manila’s victory in a 2016 arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rejected Beijing’s wide claims of sovereignty and “historic rights” over the sea. Since then, Manila has maintained a flexible policy, often viewed as erratic by local and international observers, with the goal of strengthening connections with Beijing to promote economic growth. By advancing cautiously, the Philippines wanted to prevent the maritime issue from jeopardizing its bilateral relationship. However, five years into Duterte’s administration, problems persist.
Chinese ships patrol the Philippine exclusive economic zone without interruption, and Filipino vessels are frequently unable to reach traditional fishing grounds near Scarborough Shoal due to Chinese harassment. Many Filipinos are growing suspicious of rapprochement with China if it means giving up claims to contested sea features. Since late 2019, Manila has shown less willingness to ignore Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea, submitting diplomatic protest notes to China in reaction to purported territorial transgressions.
More importantly, Duterte reversed his abrupt February 2020 revocation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, which permits the US to deploy military personnel in the Philippines and undertake joint exercises with Manila. In June 2020, Duterte suspended the cancellation. The United States then began referring to China’s claims in the South China Sea as “illegal,” reaffirmed its alliance with the Philippines, and stated that the Mutual Defense Treaty covers attacks on Philippine forces or vessels in the Sea. A confrontation in March 2021 over Whitsun Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, involving hundreds of Chinese ships, further inflamed anti-China sentiment in the Philippines and strained relations. On July 30, 2021, Duterte formally reinstated the Visiting Forces Agreement.
Balancing a treaty relationship with the United States with periodic conflicts with neighbors, including a rising great power like China, is particularly challenging. Manila is allied with Washington through a longstanding relationship, but geographical and economic realities necessitate a compromise with Beijing. Simultaneously, Internal conflicts within the bureaucratic establishment and military, along with the interaction of elite interests and public opinion, often lead to apparent inconsistencies in government policy. To manage tensions and reduce the risk of maritime incidents escalating into conflict, the Philippines should bolster risk management measures and advocate for regional security cooperation.
Conclusion
The South China Sea disputes are complex, involving multiple countries and a range of economic, strategic, and security considerations, with phases of escalation and quiet. Recent tensions are increasingly tied to US-China strategic competition, complicating Manila’s foreign policy. Following Duterte’s 2016 election victory, the Philippines pivoted towards China, but opinions are mixed on whether this approach has served national interests, especially given Duterte’s ad hoc methods. If the next president adopts a less pro-China stance, more incidents at sea are likely post-Duterte. However, as the Whitsun Reef incident showed, Manila can manage Beijing with cooperation and deterrence. Manila’s long-term strength may lie in separating disputes from broader China relations and standing firm when necessary. The key concern is whether the Philippines can navigate between China and the US without choosing sides in a conflict. While Manila is currently hedging effectively, rising regional tensions may make this balance unsustainable. (MEHRAAN BHAI YEH CROP KR DAIN HIGHLIGHTED WALA )The deep waters of the South China Sea are expected to remain contentious, but finalizing a Code of Conduct and enhancing regional collaboration could help prevent future escalations. Success in extending its continental shelf at the International Court of Justice depends on strong scientific data, legal arguments, and cooperative dialogue with neighbouring states, adhering to international standards and fostering a collaborative spirit.
