The United States lies nearly 7,000 miles from East Asia, separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Yet distance has never deterred Washington from projecting power across its waters. A string of strategic outposts—from Hawaii to Guam to Okinawa—extends America’s reach toward the western Pacific, where its alliances along the Asian rim anchor its presence.
From this arc of influence, the geography compresses. Only 500 miles separate China’s southeastern coast from the northern tip of the Philippines—a narrow maritime corridor where power, commerce, and national interests collide. At the center lies the South China Sea: not merely a body of water, but a contested maritime domain crisscrossed by overlapping claims, vital trade routes, and competing naval deployments.
Here, geography dictates strategy. The waters between Hainan Island and Luzon are not just conduits for global shipping; they are potential flashpoints. For the United States, influence in this maritime space has been a postwar imperative. From the Cold War’s hub-and-spokes system to Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” and Biden’s emphasis on naval diplomacy and tech alliances, successive administrations have treated the region as the fulcrum of 21st-century power.
Donald Trump, despite his often unorthodox approach to foreign policy, shared that view. His administration revived the Quad, deepened defense ties with India, and laid the groundwork for expanded U.S. military access in Southeast Asia—most notably through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines. His logic was clear: to contain China’s rise, America must stay anchored within the island chains that ring its periphery.
Zoom in. Scan the South China Sea. Reefs and shoals—Mischief Reef, Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal—are claimed by China but increasingly patrolled by Philippine vessels and shadowed by U.S. surveillance assets. The American military posture encircles this contested sea: Japan to the north, Guam to the east, Australia to the south, and at its core, nine EDCA sites across the Philippine archipelago.
From Beijing’s perspective, this is no coincidence. It is strategic encirclement in slow motion.
The arrival of U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in Manila in March 2025 only deepened these anxieties. Framing his visit as part of a broader regional tour to “strengthen shared defense visions,” Hegseth struck a familiar tone: “The U.S. seeks peace, not provocation.” But Chinese officials remained unconvinced. Days after his departure, Beijing’s Ministry of National Defense warned: “Foreign interference and bloc politics will only aggravate tensions in the region.”

China’s Strategic Narrative

To understand Beijing’s fierce response, we must see through its lens. China sees itself not as the aggressor, but as the rightful stabilizing power in what it calls its “near seas.” Its expansive claims in the South China Sea, encircled by the so-called Nine-Dash Line, are framed domestically as matters of sovereignty and historical justice.
The United States, on the other hand, is portrayed by Chinese officials and state media as an outside agitator, an extra-regional power disrupting Asia’s “natural order.” By building up military alliances and conducting joint exercises in China’s backyard, Washington is, in Beijing’s words, “undermining peace and stability under the guise of freedom of navigation.”
This narrative is more than propaganda, it shapes Chinese military strategy. The “First Island Chain” concept remains central to China’s defense doctrine. This invisible arc of islands, stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines and Borneo, represents a geographic barrier to Chinese maritime expansion and is now being hardened by U.S. forward deployments. The Philippines, once the weakest link in this chain under President Duterte’s pivot to China, is now a revitalized anchor of U.S. strategy under President Marcos Jr.

The EDCA Factor

The transformation is not symbolic, it’s logistical. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), U.S. forces now enjoy rotational access to nine Philippine military sites. What’s changed in 2025 is not just the number, but their locations and utility. Four of the most recent additions are particularly alarming to China: Naval Base Camilo Osias in Cagayan and Lal-lo Airport: Both within 500 kilometers of Taiwan, these sites are strategically positioned to support rapid-response forces and host advanced missile systems. Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Isabela: A potential launchpad for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) operations covering Taiwan and the Luzon Strait. Balabac Island Base in Palawan: Faces the contested Spratly Islands, enabling rapid deployment of maritime strike assets near the South China Sea flashpoints.
The 2025 deployment of Typhon missile systems and NMESIS coastal defense launchers at some of these sites marks a dramatic shift, from passive presence to active deterrence. According to a joint statement released after the Balikatan 2025 exercise, the EDCA sites now form a “multi-domain response hub” against threats across both the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
Beijing’s interpretation? These are not just bases, they’re springboards for conflict.

Hegseth’s Actions Triggers Chinese Alarm

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s 2025 visit to the Philippines wasn’t just about handshakes and press photos, it was a clear military signal. During his time in Manila, Hegseth oversaw the announcement of a landmark $5.58 billion U.S. arms deal, including the delivery of 20 F-16 Block 70/72 fighter jets, MQ-9B Reaper drones, and coastal defense systems like the Naval/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), capable of neutralizing Chinese vessels across contested waters.
These systems weren’t just theoretical either. Within weeks, NMESIS units were deployed to EDCA sites in Northern Luzon, just across the Bashi Channel from Taiwan, and the Balabac site facing the Spratly Islands. This deployment effectively created overlapping U.S.-Philippine missile coverage across both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, striking at the heart of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Beyond hardware, U.S. military funding to the Philippines saw a historic surge. In addition to the arms package, foreign military financing (FMF) hit a record $200 million for FY2025, more than quadrupling from the 2020 figure of just $40 million. These funds support logistics, infrastructure, and advanced interoperability with U.S. forces, signaling that Washington is investing not just in deterrence, but in long-term allied capacity.
The Balikatan 2025 joint military exercises served as the capstone of this deepening alliance. With over 15,000 troops from the Philippines, U.S., Australia, and, for the first time, Japan as a full participant, the drills featured island seizure simulations, airfield assaults, and multi-domain warfare, including cyber and space elements. Crucially, some scenarios explicitly simulated a cross-strait conflict involving Taiwan, confirming Beijing’s fear that Manila has now become a frontline state in any future Pacific war.

Diplomatic Signaling

While the military buildup was clear, the diplomatic signaling during Hegseth’s visit was just as loud. Standing beside his Filipino counterpart, Hegseth declared that the Philippines was “no longer in the gray zone, it is firmly within the camp of those defending a free and open Indo-Pacific.” He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, calling an attack on Philippine forces “an attack on us.”
For Beijing, these statements crossed multiple red lines. In a press briefing following the visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned:
“We urge the U.S. to stop sowing discord between regional countries and cease hyping up bloc confrontation. The Philippines must understand that bringing in external forces will only invite danger, not security.”
China’s Ministry of National Defense went further, labeling the visit as “a provocation that undermines peace” and vowed to take “resolute measures” to safeguard sovereignty. These statements reflect growing alarm in Beijing that the U.S. is not just projecting power, it’s doing so on China’s doorstep with local partners.

Beijing’s “External Interference” Narrative

Hegseth’s presence in Manila has amplified a long-standing Chinese narrative: that U.S. involvement in the region represents “external interference” meant to contain China’s rise. Chinese state media outlets like Global Times and People’s Daily quickly launched coordinated editorials. One Global Times headline read: “U.S. Turns Philippines into Geopolitical Pawn, Peace Further Out of Reach in Asia-Pacific”
Another article stated:
“Manila must be cautious not to be dragged into Washington’s anti-China fantasy, for it risks becoming cannon fodder in a great power game.”
This messaging reflects more than propaganda, it’s part of China’s strategic effort to delegitimize the U.S.-led alliances and frame regional military partnerships as neocolonial manipulations. It also attempts to pressure Southeast Asian nations to remain “neutral” under China’s preferred vision of “Asian solutions to Asian problems.”
However, with advanced U.S. military platforms now stationed in Luzon and Balikatan simulating Taiwan contingencies, the perception in Beijing is clear: Hegseth’s visit marks a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic boldness.
And in China’s calculus, boldness at its doorstep is a direct threat.

What If China Restricts Philippine Flights in the South China Sea?

The Implications: China’s Strategic Calculations

The expansion of U.S. military presence in the Philippines, particularly through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), has significantly impacted China’s strategic calculations. With access to nine EDCA sites, including locations in Northern Luzon and Palawan, the U.S. has enhanced its ability to project power near critical maritime chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel and the South China Sea. This development effectively reduces China’s strategic depth, constraining its freedom of maneuver and increasing its vulnerability to potential U.S. and allied operations.​
China is particularly concerned about the potential use of these Philippine bases for operations related to Taiwan. The proximity of Northern Luzon to Taiwan makes it a strategic location for monitoring and potentially responding to cross-strait contingencies. The integration of advanced U.S. military assets, such as the Naval/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and MQ-9B Reaper drones, into these bases highlights the Philippines’ growing role in regional security dynamics.​

Regional Power Dynamics

Hegseth’s visit and the subsequent deepening of U.S.-Philippine military cooperation have altered the regional power balance, particularly concerning ASEAN and other claimant states in the South China Sea. By strengthening its alliance with the Philippines, the U.S. challenges China’s efforts to cultivate its own regional influence through economic initiatives and bilateral engagements. This shift encourages other Southeast Asian nations to reassess their strategic alignments and consider bolstering ties with external powers to counterbalance China’s assertiveness.​
China’s narrative of “external interference” is increasingly contested as regional actors prioritize their sovereignty and security interests. The U.S. presence in the Philippines serves as a counterweight to China’s expansive claims and militarization activities in the South China Sea, reinforcing the principle of freedom of navigation and the rules-based international order.​

The Risk of Miscalculation

The intensification of U.S.-Philippine military cooperation raises concerns about the increased risk of miscalculations and unintended escalation. Recent incidents, such as the August 2023 Second Thomas Shoal standoff, where a China Coast Guard ship blocked a Philippine resupply mission and used water cannons, highlight the potential for confrontations to spiral out of control. Similarly, in June 2024, Chinese Coast Guard personnel reportedly brandished weapons during another resupply mission, resulting in injuries to Philippine personnel. These encounters highlight the volatility of the region and the necessity for clear communication channels and confidence-building measures to prevent inadvertent clashes. China’s apprehension about the U.S. military’s proximity to its claimed territories is compounded by the possibility of rapid escalation from routine patrols to armed conflict, especially given the complex web of alliances and mutual defense commitments in place.

The Historical Patterns of Distrust

China’s deep-rooted suspicion of U.S. intentions in the region isn’t new, it’s shaped by decades of historical friction. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a substantial military presence in Asia, with its largest overseas bases located in the Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. These facilities, active until the early 1990s, served as key nodes for projecting U.S. power across the Pacific.
To Beijing, these bases weren’t just military assets, they symbolized American dominance in China’s backyard. The closure of these bases in 1991–1992 was viewed by many Chinese strategists not as a retreat, but as a temporary repositioning. The reactivation of U.S. military access to Philippine sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in recent years revives this historical anxiety. From China’s perspective, it’s déjà vu, with added missiles and modern surveillance.

China’s “Century of Humiliation” Narrative

China’s foreign policy today remains heavily influenced by the traumatic legacy of its so-called “Century of Humiliation”, a period from the mid-1800s to the early 20th century when the Qing Dynasty suffered repeated invasions, territorial losses, and unequal treaties at the hands of Western powers and Japan. This national memory is carefully cultivated and weaponized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to justify an assertive defense posture.
Modern Chinese propaganda emphasizes that external forces once exploited China when it was weak, and that Beijing must now stand firm against any attempt at containment or interference. State-run media, such as Global Times and Xinhua, frequently frame U.S. military moves in Asia as echoes of colonial bullying. This narrative primes domestic audiences to view U.S. partnerships, especially military agreements like EDCA, with intense suspicion and patriotic defiance.

https://indopacificreport.com/2025/03/02/philippines-eyeing-indian-missiles/

The South China Sea as a Core Interest

The South China Sea is not just a strategic waterway for China, it’s increasingly portrayed as a non-negotiable core interest, on par with Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Chinese officials have repeatedly warned that they will take “all necessary measures” to defend their sovereignty in the region, even if it means risking confrontation.
In 2024, after expanded U.S.-Philippine drills and the deployment of NMESIS anti-ship missile systems, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin declared:
“The South China Sea is not a place for countries outside the region to stir up trouble… China will firmly safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.”
This statement reflects Beijing’s zero-tolerance policy toward what it sees as encirclement, and highlights why even non-lethal military cooperation between the U.S. and Philippines is treated as a strategic red line.

The Chinese Perspective: A Call for “Regional Stability”

Recap: Why Beijing Sees Hegseth’s Visit as an Escalation

From China’s viewpoint, U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and later Pacific-focused defense officials like Pete Hegseth visiting the Philippines are not routine diplomatic gestures, they’re unmistakable signals of intensifying military alignment. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), once limited in scope, now includes nine Philippine bases, four of which are near Taiwan and the South China Sea. The deployment of advanced U.S. missile systems like the NMESIS (Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System), the Balikatan exercises involving over 16,000 troops, and U.S. funding for infrastructure upgrades are all seen as part of a coordinated containment strategy.
To Beijing, Hegseth’s visit isn’t just about defense cooperation, it’s about enabling U.S. power projection from Philippine soil, thereby threatening China’s strategic space.

China’s Vision of Regional Order

China advocates for what it calls “Asian solutions to Asian problems.” This vision is rooted in the idea of a multipolar world, where Western hegemony is replaced by regional powers determining their own destiny, with Beijing, naturally, as a leading force. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road, China-ASEAN Dialogue Mechanisms, and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), China presents itself as a stabilizing presence offering infrastructure, trade, and “mutual respect.”
In response to recent events, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in March 2025:
“Peace and stability in the South China Sea can only be maintained when external powers stop meddling. China respects its neighbors but will not tolerate provocations near its borders.”
Meanwhile, Global Times editorials echoed this sentiment:
“Washington is turning Manila into a pawn. If the Philippines allows itself to be used, it should also prepare for the consequences of great power games.”
To Beijing, stability is not the absence of tension, it’s the absence of U.S. military entrenchment.

The Potential for Conflict

The increased tempo of joint U.S.-Philippine drills, the militarization of contested waters, and Beijing’s aggressive maritime patrols all raise the risk of a miscalculation. Already, confrontations between Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal have resulted in injuries, water cannon attacks, and damaged vessels. In the absence of robust crisis communication channels, a single flashpoint, like a collision or accidental escalation, could spiral into a regional conflict with devastating consequences.

Final Thought

Will the South China Sea remain a vital corridor of global trade, or become the spark that ignites Asia’s next great conflict? The answer may hinge not on firepower, but on whether diplomacy can keep pace with rising military tensions.

The Philippines’ Rising Maritime Power: A Silent Storm Brewing in the Pacific