In our previous coverage of the Ayungin Shoal standoff, we explored the rising tensions in the West Philippine Sea. Now, those tensions have flared again, this time at Scarborough Shoal, in an incident marked by high-stakes maneuvering, visible damage, and competing narratives from Manila, Beijing, and Washington. On August 11, 2025, the Philippine Coast Guard’s BRP Suluan was on a mission supporting our fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. Out of nowhere, a China Coast Guard cutter (3104) and the PLA Navy’s Type 052D destroyer Guilin (164) swooped in, blocking, chasing, and firing water cannons in a reckless bid to force the Suluan away. But here’s the twist: in all that aggressive maneuvering, the Chinese cutter slammed right into their own destroyer. PCG video shows the cutter’s bow crumpled, smoke rising, and our Suluan skillfully dodging danger. The Filipinos even offered medical aid over the radio, silence from the other side.
Fast-forward to August 13–14. Enter the USS Higgins (DDG-76) and USS Cincinnati (LCS-20), two U.S. Navy warships cruising in for a Freedom of Navigation Operation. The Higgins got as close as 13 nautical miles from the shoal, the very edge of territorial seas, while a Chinese frigate shadowed them. Beijing cried “illegal intrusion,” but the U.S. 7th Fleet fired back: “China’s statement about this mission is false. The United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. Nothing China says will deter us.”
For Filipinos and Americans alike, this isn’t just a headline, it’s a reminder that Scarborough Shoal isn’t just a rock in the sea. It’s a flashpoint for sovereignty, maritime rights, and global power politics. Imagine the tension: our coast guard navigating under pressure, Chinese warships clashing into each other, and U.S. destroyers rolling in days later like a maritime mic-drop. The world is watching, and the message is clear, nobody’s backing down.
So, what now? Will Manila double down diplomatically or step up military presence? Will Beijing escalate patrols? Could this spark more allied drills in the region? One thing’s certain, the waves at Scarborough are carrying more than just saltwater; they’re carrying the weight of national pride and international law. If you’re fired up by this story, hit that like button, subscribe, and drop your thoughts below. Should allies push back harder, or is it time to cool things down? Let’s talk.
The Clash of Narratives Three Sides, One Shoal
In the contested waters of the West Philippine Sea, incidents rarely pass without a fight over the story as much as over the territory. What unfolded in mid-August 2025 near Scarborough Shoal, known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc and in China as Huangyan Dao, was no exception. A collision, a high-profile U.S. naval presence, and a war of words between capitals have produced three sharply divergent narratives. China’s version paints the United States as a law-breaker. The Philippines counters that Beijing’s actions were reckless and self-defeating. Washington rejects Beijing’s account outright, framing its own role as the lawful defense of navigational rights. These competing stories are more than rhetoric, they are strategic tools, shaping perceptions at home, in the region, and across the globe.
China’s Position “We Expelled the Intruder”
Beijing’s Southern Theater Command moved first and fast, issuing a statement that its naval and coast guard forces had “tracked, monitored, warned, and expelled” the U.S. destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76) from waters near Huangyan Dao. The charge was straightforward: the Higgins had violated China’s sovereignty and international law. In Beijing’s telling, the presence of a U.S. warship so close to Scarborough Shoal, whether 13 nautical miles away as the U.S. Navy says, or further, was not innocent passage but a deliberate intrusion. This fits neatly into a long-running Chinese narrative: that Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) are not benign legal exercises but “provocative” destabilizers.
By using terms like “expelled” and tying them to sovereignty claims, China reinforces the idea that it exercises full jurisdiction over Scarborough. Every time it publicly frames a U.S. patrol as an intrusion, it tries to normalize the perception, both domestically and internationally, that these waters are not up for debate. The statement also serves a dual audience: rallying domestic nationalism at home while signaling resolve abroad.
The Philippines’ Position — “Dangerous, Reckless, and Your Own Fault”
Manila’s account is not just different, it’s almost a mirror image. At the heart of the Philippine narrative is the August 11 collision between a China Coast Guard cutter and the PLA Navy destroyer Guilin (164). The Philippine Coast Guard says the incident occurred during an aggressive pursuit of its vessel BRP Suluan. According to Philippine officials, the cutter repeatedly blocked and water-cannoned the Suluan in an attempt to drive it away from fishing grounds. In one of these maneuvers, the cutter veered into the path of its own destroyer, slamming bow-first into the larger vessel. The collision damaged both ships, a costly mistake caught on PCG video.
From Manila’s perspective, the episode is a textbook case of unsafe, escalatory behavior, not from the U.S., but from China against the Philippines. PCG spokesmen have emphasized that the Suluan was acting lawfully and that Filipino crews even offered medical aid over the radio to the Chinese ships, which went unanswered. The humanitarian gesture is part of the message: despite harassment, Manila plays by the rules.
When the USS Higgins and USS Cincinnati (LCS-20) appeared near Scarborough Shoal on August 13–14, the Philippines described the U.S. presence matter-of-factly. PCG spokesman Jay Tarriela confirmed there were no incidents involving the U.S. ships, but he logged every shadowing vessel in the area: four China Coast Guard cutters, six maritime militia boats, and one PLAN frigate. The count is more than a detail; it’s a data point meant to show that China maintains a layered presence at Scarborough, coast guard, militia, and navy, even when the primary activity is watching others.
For Manila, that running tally is part of a broader strategy of transparency: release video, provide numbers, and counter Beijing’s version with verifiable facts. It’s both a defensive move against propaganda and an offensive one, painting China as the side over-invested in intimidation at sea.
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The United States’ Position “False Claim, Lawful Mission”
Washington’s reply was blunt. The U.S. 7th Fleet rejected Beijing’s “expelled” claim as “false”, stressing that the “Higgins acted entirely within international legal standards, conducted its Freedom of Navigation Operation, and departed on its own timetable. For the U.S., these operations are not about staking a claim in the South China Sea’s sovereignty disputes. Instead, they are about defending the principle that no country can unilaterally impose restrictions, like requiring advance notice or permission, for the innocent passage of warships through territorial seas. Washington sees such requirements, enforced by China, Taiwan, and occasionally Vietnam, as unlawful under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The American framing deliberately shifts the debate from “whose waters are these?” to “what are the rules that govern these waters?” It is a subtle but significant reframing. It allows Washington to challenge China’s practice without appearing to take Manila’s side on the sovereignty question, maintaining consistency in its global freedom-of-navigation policy.
Side-by-Side Legal Frames
China and Taiwan both hold that foreign warships cannot simply pass through their claimed territorial seas without clearance. This means either prior permission or advance notice is required before an “innocent passage”, even if the warship does nothing more than transit through, weapons secured, radar silent. For Beijing and Taipei, this is a safeguard for sovereignty and security, a way to assert control over contested waters and prevent surprise incursions.
The United States flatly rejects that requirement, calling it inconsistent with international law. Washington treats prior-permission rules as unlawful and has made FONOPs its tool to contest them. The Higgins’ patrol near Scarborough Shoal was one more entry in a long series, 46 South China Sea FONOPs from 2016 to 2023, intended to show that U.S. ships will sail wherever international law allows, without asking for a coastal state’s blessing.
UNCLOS itself provides the baseline: all ships, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage through territorial seas as long as they do not engage in actions “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security” of the coastal state. That right does not require prior notification or permission — a point the U.S. emphasizes every time it runs a FONOP in contested waters.
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Why Do These Narratives Matter?
Each of the three positions is carefully designed to serve domestic and international goals. China’s narrative seeks to project control, discourage foreign naval presence, and reinforce its sovereignty claims. By declaring that it “expelled” a U.S. destroyer, Beijing tells its own citizens that it can and will defend the motherland, and warns others that there is a price to be paid for challenging its red lines.
The Philippines’ account aims to show restraint under pressure while documenting Chinese aggression. The emphasis on video evidence, vessel counts, and humanitarian gestures serves to build credibility in the court of public opinion and to strengthen alliances by portraying Manila as a responsible, law-abiding actor.
The United States frames its role as the defense of global norms rather than regional claims. This allows Washington to conduct operations in the South China Sea without being drawn directly into the sovereignty disputes, an approach that preserves its broader strategic freedom while still pushing back on practices it views as unlawful.
One Incident, Three Realities
The August collision and the subsequent U.S. naval presence at Scarborough Shoal are a single chain of events, but they look entirely different depending on who is telling the story. For Beijing, it is a case of a foreign warship intruding into waters they claim as their own. China’s Southern Theater Command says its forces acted decisively, tracking, warning, and ultimately expelling the USS Higgins. This version reinforces China’s sovereignty narrative and presents its military as both vigilant and capable of defending territorial integrity.
For Manila, the focal point is not the U.S. destroyer but the China Coast Guard’s harassment of the BRP Suluan. Philippine officials say that in the course of reckless blocking and water-cannoning, a Chinese cutter collided with its own PLA Navy destroyer, a self-inflicted mishap caught on PCG video. In this account, the U.S. presence days later was uneventful, but notable for the heavy Chinese shadowing force that surrounded it.
For Washington, the story is straightforward: the USS Higgins conducted a lawful Freedom of Navigation Operation, in line with international law, and left on its own schedule. The U.S. rejects China’s claim of “expulsion” as fiction, framing the patrol not as provocation but as the defense of a global norm, the right to sail freely in accordance with UNCLOS.
These aren’t just different interpretations of the same facts; they are fundamentally incompatible realities, each crafted to serve a strategic purpose. None of the three capitals has any incentive to shift positions. In short, Beijing calls it a violation, Manila calls it reckless self-damage, and Washington calls it lawful navigation.
Why It’s Hard to Resolve?
The problem is not just that the positions differ; it’s that they are anchored in legal interpretations and political goals that can’t be reconciled without one side giving up core claims. China’s requirement for prior permission is inseparable from its sovereignty claims. The Philippines’ rejection of Chinese control at Scarborough is tied to its defense of fishing rights and its EEZ. The U.S. rejection of prior-permission rules is part of a global policy it applies from the South China Sea to the Black Sea. As long as these legal frames remain locked in place, every close pass, every shadowing maneuver, and every verbal exchange is another opportunity for the narratives to clash. And in this environment, even accidents, like the PLAN–CCG collision, become ammunition in the information battle.
The downstream challenges particularly for the Philippines
For the Philippines, Scarborough Shoal has evolved from a distant territorial symbol into a daily proving ground for strategy, law, and political will. This is no longer about maps and maritime charts, it’s about keeping a visible, consistent presence in contested waters while walking a razor-thin line between defending rights and avoiding incidents that could spiral out of control. Each deployment of a Philippine Coast Guard or Bureau of Fisheries vessel is a calculated gamble, as crews operate under constant threat of water-cannon blasts, ramming attempts, and aggressive blocking maneuvers from larger, better-resourced Chinese ships. The risks are not abstract: the past two years have brought multiple incidents that left hulls dented, equipment damaged, and sailors injured, underlining that asserting access is costly, dangerous, and yet unavoidable if Manila is to keep its UNCLOS-based rights meaningful.
The U.S. Navy’s presence in the shoal’s vicinity acts as a powerful deterrent signal, proof that the Philippines is not alone in the world’s most watched maritime flashpoint. But that same presence often triggers sharper Chinese reactions, both at sea and in the information space. Incidents like Beijing’s “expelled” claim are not just throwaway propaganda lines; they’re crafted to undermine allied credibility and create doubt about who actually controls the waters. Managing the U.S.–Philippines alliance in this climate requires precision: synchronized legal messaging grounded in UNCLOS, immediate release of clear video and photographic evidence when harassment occurs, and a crisis communications network with allies that can coordinate talking points and operational responses in real time. Without that, the narrative battle can be lost even when the tactical facts are on Manila’s side.
On the capability front, the Philippines has an ambitious blueprint in its Re-Horizon 3 modernization program, a decade-long, US $35 billion plan to acquire shore-based missile systems, improve maritime domain awareness networks, and recapitalize both air and naval fleets. On paper, it’s the largest capability leap in the country’s history. In practice, progress is slowed by budget disbursement delays, procurement bottlenecks, and political debates over priorities, leaving near-term vulnerabilities in exactly the areas now under the greatest pressure. For example, the ability to monitor militia swarms in real time or to project persistent presence beyond the EEZ’s edge is still developing, meaning the Coast Guard and Navy often have to stretch thin to cover multiple hotspots at once.
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Beyond the strategic and military dimensions lies a human reality that is immediate and unforgiving. Scarborough Shoal is not just a maritime chessboard, it is a rich fishing ground that sustains livelihoods across Luzon’s coastal communities. Every blockade, every water-cannon run, and every day that fishermen are forced to turn back has a direct impact: smaller catches, lower incomes, and mounting debt for families whose lives depend on the sea. These economic blows quickly turn into political ones, with growing public pressure on the government to not only defend the shoal in principle, but to do so visibly and assertively. The challenge for Manila is to meet those expectations without triggering the very escalation that could shut the shoal to Filipino fishermen altogether.
In this way, Scarborough Shoal has become a test on four fronts at once: operational resilience under pressure, information dominance in a crowded media environment, capability growth against time and budget constraints, and the protection of livelihoods that anchor the political legitimacy of any maritime policy. It is a contest where success is measured not just in miles sailed or boats deployed, but in the ability to keep the balance, between deterrence and provocation, between principle and pragmatism, and between national pride and the everyday survival of those who fish its waters.
What to Watch Next
The next chapter in this Scarborough Shoal standoff will be written in both nautical miles and narratives. Watch closely to see whether U.S. warships repeat sub–15 nautical mile passes, a proximity that tests not only Beijing’s patience but also its tactical nerve. Keep an eye on whether the People’s Liberation Army Navy continues to assign a frigate to shadow every U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the area, signaling a willingness to raise the military profile of each encounter. Equally important: track any jump above the six maritime militia boats that PCG spokesman Jay Tarriela flagged as the baseline. A surge in militia numbers isn’t just crowding the waters, it’s a potential precursor to orchestrated gray-zone harassment, the kind of slow-burn escalation that’s harder to headline but easier to sustain. And finally, note whether there’s genuine movement toward binding rules of the road that extend beyond navies to the China Coast Guard and its militia fleet, the actors responsible for most of the rammings and water-cannon blasts. Previous efforts have left these players outside the formal guardrails, and that gap is where many of the riskiest encounters happen. As Lt. Sarah Merrill of the U.S. 7th Fleet put it: “China’s statement about this mission is false. The United States is defending its right to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, Nothing China says otherwise will deter us.” And as the Philippine Coast Guard’s own on-scene account made clear: “Four Chinese coast guard ships, six maritime militia boats, and a PLAN frigate shadowed the U.S. destroyer and LCS near Scarborough Shoal.”
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End Note
Scarborough Shoal is no longer just a contested reef, it’s a barometer of the region’s strategic temperature. Each run by a U.S. destroyer, each militia boat that appears on the horizon, and each press release out of Beijing, Manila, or Washington is a move in a multi-layered contest of presence, perception, and principle. Whether this moment simmers into routine or boils into crisis will depend on choices made in the coming weeks, and on who wins the battle to define what happened, and why, in one of the most heavily watched stretches of water on Earth.
