“The Study of History lies at the foundation of all sound Military Conclusion & practice” (Alfred Thayer Mahan)
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. naval officer and historian, was hailed by John Keegan as “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.” His seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, garnered immediate acclaim, particularly in Europe. This was followed by The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, which cemented his global prominence.
Mahan believed that national greatness was intrinsically linked to sea power, emphasizing its economic utility in peace and control during war. He utilized historical examples to support his beliefs, advocating that the education of naval officers should be grounded in a thorough study of history. Drawing on the principles of Jomini, Mahan stressed the importance of strategic locations such as choke points, canals, and coaling facilities, along with quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet.
He argued that in peacetime, states should enhance production and shipping capacities while acquiring overseas holdings. However, he emphasized that the number of coal fuelling stations and strategic sites should be limited to avoid overextending the mother country’s resources. Mahan posited that a navy’s primary duty was to secure command of the sea, ensuring its own sea communications while denying the adversary access to them and, if necessary, regulating neutral trade. Achieving control of the sea required destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet rather than targeting commerce. This strategy called for a concentration of naval forces composed of numerous well-manned capital ships, operated on the principle that the best defense is a strong offensive.
Mahan also contended that naval dominance, even temporarily, could be crucial in supporting land forces. He envisioned a transnational consortium using naval power to defend a multinational free trade system. His pre-submarine era ideas slowed the adoption of convoys as a defensive measure against the German U-boat campaign in World War I. By the 1930s, the U.S. Navy had developed long-range submarines to attack Japanese ships. However, during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy, adhering to Mahan’s doctrines, used their submarines as fleet auxiliaries and failed to target American supply lines effectively.
Analyzing the Spanish-American War, Mahan noted the vast distances in the Pacific necessitated a battle fleet with long-range striking power. He believed that competent political and naval leadership were as crucial as geography in the development of sea power. His political analysis favored a transnational consortium over a single nation-state and aimed for free commerce rather than autarky. Mahan’s understanding of geography’s impact on strategy was tempered by his recognition of contingency’s role in shaping outcomes.
China’s Attraction to Mahan’s
China’s naval establishment has long revered the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. It is no exaggeration to say that no single thinker has had a greater influence on Chinese maritime policy since post-revolutionary China began focusing on the sea in the late twentieth century. However, this is changing. Chinese naval strategists are increasingly drawn to the works of British naval thinker Sir Julian Corbett. This shift reflects and promotes a significant change in Chinese grand strategy, with implications for the United States and the entire Indo-Pacific region.
Mahan’s primary arguments, while innovative in the nineteenth century, are relatively straightforward. He asserted that great nations, even innately insular ones like the United States, have crucial maritime interests ranging from coastal defense to the protection of major commerce routes. Consequently, every truly great power must safeguard its interests from potential threats. For Mahan, this meant that a powerful nation must control the world’s oceans. He argued that such dominance could only be achieved by decisively defeating the enemy’s major fleet in battle. Therefore, commerce raiding and other fragmented naval operations were distractions that could never be strategically decisive. The concentration of forces and what Mahan termed “offensive defense” were essential to achieving “command of the seas,” which he saw as the primary goal of great power naval strategy.
The reasons for Mahan’s popularity among both American and Chinese navalists are evident. Mahan wrote for and about a rising power, the United States, which was realizing the need to secure key maritime interests to prosper and fulfill its destiny as a great power. Initially, he believed these interests were concentrated in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the sea lanes that would emerge with the opening of the Panama Canal. As his ideas evolved and U.S. interests extended beyond nearby waters, Mahan focused on the far seas, which he deemed critical to U.S. security and prosperity. This perspective appealed to American leaders such as President Theodore Roosevelt, who envisioned the United States as a true global superpower. Successive generations of American naval and political leaders saw that as the United States established itself as a global power, it required a navy capable of global operations.
Contemporary Chinese naval and political leaders are drawn to Mahan’s ideas for similar reasons. As market reforms spurred economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and China became more dependent on seaborne trade, Chinese officials recognized the importance of securing their maritime interests. Initially, these interests were framed in terms of China’s near seas: dominating the waters of the East and South China Seas, following a rough curve from Japan in the north, past Taiwan and the Philippines, down to Singapore and Malaysia, and preventing China from being hemmed in by the “First Island Chain.” Later, as China’s maritime trade routes globalized, Chinese naval strategists shifted their focus to the far seas, which were increasingly seen as vital to Chinese security and prosperity. Throughout these periods, Mahan’s works provided a conceptual foundation for considering the naval strategy best suited for a rising China. Although the Chinese naval establishment largely rejected Mahan’s ideas on decisive battles and removing the enemy fleet from the seas, they enthusiastically embraced his views on the necessity for a great power to have a navy capable of global operations.
Shift to Julian Corbett
Chinese naval strategists have inherited and adapted Mahan’s notion that a great state needs a fleet capable of seizing control of critical waterways and choke points from powerful adversaries, ensuring the security of global commerce on which its prosperity depends. They also internalized his view that a truly great power requires a truly powerful navy, capable of not just safeguarding its maritime interests but also projecting its influence globally. However, over the last decade or two, Chinese navalists have increasingly turned to the work of British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett.
Corbett agreed with Mahan on the importance of controlling vital sea channels for both military and commercial interests but differed on several key points. Most fundamentally, Corbett disagreed with Mahan’s near-exclusive emphasis on achieving ultimate dominance of the seas by annihilating the enemy’s naval might in decisive battles. Mahan’s basic idea of “naval strategy” was that comprehensive command of the seas was always the best method to achieve a great power’s broad strategic goals, accomplished by sweeping the enemy fleet away. Corbett, however, believed that each great power’s grand strategy necessitated a unique “maritime strategy.” While Mahan advocated for bringing the enemy’s main fleet to battle and destroying it in a decisive engagement, Corbett suggested that maritime strategy could also involve temporary and limited “control of the sea,” blockade, trade raiding and defense, or homeland defense, depending on the grand strategy being pursued. Corbett, like Clausewitz, believed that politics should always dictate military strategy, and that maritime policy should be based on a nation’s specific political goals, objectives, and limitations.
There are several reasons for Chinese navalists’ growing interest in Corbett’s work. Perhaps the most important cause has been a significant shift in China’s grand strategy over the last decade or so. For much of the post-revolutionary period, China’s strategy was one of geopolitical prudence, even isolationism, with priorities focused on defending the Chinese mainland, reintegrating lost territories, and pressing limited claims to disputed territories. However, in recent decades, China has effectively adopted a new grand strategy, best described as “offshore balancing.”
This strategy involves three main components:
- Securing Land and Maritime Borders: China is committed to securing its borders, including sovereignty over the waters along the new ten dash line in the South China Sea, disputed territories along its boundary with India, islands claimed in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. This also includes preventing the United States from threatening the Chinese mainland or intervening in territorial disputes involving China.
- Dominating Immediate Neighbors: China aims to dominate its immediate neighbors, both territorially contiguous ones (e.g., Nepal, Bhutan, and Vietnam) and those in the maritime region between its home waters and the Second Island Chain.
- Maintaining a Favorable Balance of Power: China seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power as far afield as the Third Island Chain (encompassing Alaska, Hawaii, and New Zealand), the Fourth Island Chain (linking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Diego Garcia), and the Fifth Island Chain (stretching from Djibouti to South Africa, including the Persian Gulf). In this context, a favorable balance of power is one that is not dominated by a single state but leans toward China, implying an unfavorable balance for the United States.
Corbett’s theories align well with this grand strategy, as they emphasize the need for a flexible maritime strategy tailored to specific political goals. For China, this means developing the capability to:
- Deter, Delay, and Weaken Potential U.S. Military Engagement: China aims to prevent, delay, and, if necessary, weaken any potential U.S. military involvement in maritime sovereignty issues or conflicts involving Taiwan. This strategy focuses on protecting China’s coastline and ports while establishing and defending sovereignty claims.
- Deny U.S. Command of the Seas: China seeks to deny the United States control over commercially and strategically important waterways and chokepoints. This requires maintaining a persistent maritime presence in strategic locations, even under hostile conditions and for extended periods.
- Counter India’s Naval Capabilities: China aims to prevent India from controlling or disrupting crucial sea routes and choke points leading to the Fifth Island Chain.
China has been implementing this maritime strategy for more than a decade. It has developed and deployed air, naval, and missile forces to create an anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) bubble encompassing the East China Sea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, including its entire coastline and disputed islands. These forces include submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-ship cruise missiles, supported by major naval bases in Qingdao, Ningbo, Zhanjiang, and Hainan Island, as well as installations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Beyond these near seas defensive zone, China has deployed naval forces to dominate the seas up to the Second Island Chain. These forces include modern land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking U.S. military sites on Okinawa and Guam, as well as anti-ship ballistic missiles with advanced re-entry vehicle technology, designed to deter, delay, and, if necessary, impair U.S. military operations, denying the U.S. control of the seas within the Second Island Chain.
China is also extending its reach beyond the Fifth Island Chain. It frequently deploys ships, including nuclear-powered submarines, in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas, maintains a naval station in Djibouti, and controls port facilities in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan. Additionally, China reportedly has a military observation base on Myanmar’s Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, facilitating Chinese naval access to the Indian Ocean. Recently, China and Iran formed a strategic alliance, including joint training, research and weapon development, intelligence sharing, and Chinese investment in Iranian ports, adding to China’s “string of pearls.”
As China completes its offshore balancing infrastructure, Chinese carrier strike groups may begin to patrol the Indian Ocean regularly, challenging U.S. and allied naval dominance in the region.
End Note
“Force is never more operative than what it is known to exist but is not brandished”
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on maritime strategy, particularly in the context of the South China Sea, remains profound and enduring. Mahan, a prominent naval theorist of the late 19th century, emphasized the strategic significance of sea power in shaping global geopolitics. His ideas highlight the importance of controlling maritime routes and establishing naval dominance to secure national interests and global influence.
In the South China Sea, Mahan’s theories resonate deeply as nations vie for control over critical sea lanes and disputed territories rich in natural resources. Mahan’s concept of sea power has influenced modern maritime strategies in the region, prompting countries like China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others to invest heavily in naval capabilities and infrastructure. China, in particular, has drawn from Mahan’s principles to assert its claims over almost the entire South China Sea. This has been achieved through a combination of naval expansion, island-building, and diplomatic maneuvering to strengthen its position. This strategy reflects Mahan’s emphasis on the strategic value of controlling key maritime chokepoints and establishing naval dominance to secure economic and military advantages.
Moreover, Mahan’s theories continue to shape international responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The United States and its allies, adhering to Mahanian principles, have adopted strategies aimed at preserving freedom of navigation and countering China’s expansive claims through enhanced naval presence, multilateral partnerships, and support for regional allies. This approach underscores Mahan’s enduring relevance in contemporary naval doctrine, where the South China Sea has become a focal point of geopolitical competition and strategic maneuvering.
In essence, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories on sea power have profoundly influenced the strategic calculus in the South China Sea and continue to shape modern maritime strategies. His emphasis on naval dominance, control of maritime routes, and the strategic value of sea lanes remains pertinent as nations navigate complex geopolitical dynamics in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions.
