The Philippines has embraced a bold new approach in its struggle against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea: “assertive transparency.” Instead of keeping maritime confrontations hidden, Manila now actively documents and publicizes incidents, whether it’s Chinese water cannons drenching Philippine supply boats, ramming maneuvers at shoals, or the intimidating presence of swarms of Chinese coast guard and militia vessels. The goal is clear: expose China’s behavior to the world, rally international sympathy, and frame Beijing as the aggressor in the court of global opinion.
Yet despite this strategy, China’s actions have only intensified. Over the past two years, Beijing has increased the frequency and aggression of its “gray-zone” operations, from blockades at Scarborough Shoal to escalations at Second Thomas Shoal and Sandy Cay. Instead of pulling back under the weight of bad press, China has doubled down, sending more ships, hardening its rhetoric, and dismissing international criticism as “interference by outside powers.”
This raises a difficult but necessary question: Is China actually afraid of the Philippines’ transparency strategy or is it emboldened by it? At its core, the problem lies in the nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For the CCP, domestic control and national prestige outweigh reputational costs abroad. What might look like a public-relations defeat in Western eyes can, in Beijing’s calculus, be turned into propaganda at home, framing the Philippines as a U.S. pawn and China as the defender of sovereignty.
Thus, while the Philippines’ transparency strategy has been effective at exposing Chinese coercion and winning allies, it has not deterred China’s aggression. In fact, it may be contributing to a cycle of escalation. Manila shines the spotlight; Beijing responds with more force, unwilling to show weakness. The thesis is stark: the Philippines’ transparency strategy alone cannot shift China’s behavior, because it collides directly with the CCP’s priorities of control, nationalism, and dominance in the South China Sea.
The Failure of “Assertive Transparency”
The strategy behind Manila’s “assertive transparency” approach has been straightforward: shine a constant light on China’s coercive actions in the South China Sea. Every confrontation is documented with photos, videos, and official reports from the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), then released to the public and amplified through international media. What once took place in the shadows, water cannons drenching supply boats at Second Thomas Shoal, “shouldering” maneuvers at Scarborough, or swarms of Chinese militia boats encircling reefs, is now immediately visible to the world. This is a deliberate break from past administrations, which often downplayed or concealed such incidents to avoid escalation.
The goal has been twofold. First, to shame China in the court of global opinion, portraying it as a bully violating international law and disregarding the 2016 Hague ruling that invalidated its “nine-dash line” claims. Second, to garner sympathy and support from allies and partners like the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Union, thereby strengthening Manila’s diplomatic hand. In practice, the strategy has succeeded at drawing headlines, mobilizing statements of condemnation, and rallying allies to conduct joint patrols or provide security assistance. It has effectively internationalized the South China Sea issue, making it harder for Beijing to dismiss it as a purely “bilateral” dispute.
But the outcome on the water tells a different story. Rather than being deterred, China has accelerated its actions. The frequency of Chinese coast guard and militia deployments has risen sharply, with the Philippine Navy reporting a record 49 Chinese vessels operating in disputed areas in June 2025, the highest monthly total that year. Instead of reducing harassment, Beijing has escalated: more aggressive use of water cannons, deliberate collisions, and even attempts to land personnel on disputed features like Sandy Cay. Far from restraining Chinese behavior, transparency has provoked Beijing to double down, determined not to appear weak or submissive in the face of Manila’s global exposure.
This pattern has a historical parallel in Ukraine’s use of transparency against Russia. In the lead-up to the 2022 invasion, Kyiv and its Western partners repeatedly publicized satellite imagery of Russian troop buildups, cyber operations, and hybrid tactics. The intention was to expose Moscow’s moves, deny it the element of surprise, and rally international condemnation before the tanks rolled. Yet, despite the clarity of evidence and the flood of global attention, Russia invaded anyway. Transparency achieved its goal of informing the world but failed in its ultimate purpose: deterrence. The Philippine case mirrors this. Publicizing China’s actions generates sympathy and moral advantage, but it does not change Beijing’s calculus because the CCP values control, prestige, and sovereignty claims more than reputational costs abroad.
The CCP’s Imperatives and the Limits of “Shame”
For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), territorial integrity and regime legitimacy are inseparable. Since the founding of the People’s Republic, Beijing has tied its survival to the idea of defending sovereignty against foreign encroachment. The South China Sea dispute is not just about reefs and fisheries, it is a stage on which the CCP demonstrates its ability to uphold China’s “historic rights” and resist foreign pressure. Propaganda repeatedly frames the struggle as part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” linking maritime control to the century-old wounds of colonial humiliation. For the CCP, to yield ground in the South China Sea is to jeopardize its credibility at home, which is more dangerous than global condemnation abroad. This is why the Hague Tribunal’s 2016 ruling was dismissed as “null and void” and why Beijing continues to invest massive resources in coast guard ships, maritime militias, and naval expansion: backing down is simply not an option.
At the same time, the CCP’s perception of strength is valued more than avoiding reputational damage. In fact, Beijing often thrives on defying international opinion, portraying criticism as evidence of Western bias and external containment. For the Party, the priority is not whether the Philippines, the U.S., or Europe label its actions as bullying, it is whether the Chinese public perceives the leadership as strong, unyielding, and uncompromising. This domestic narrative matters far more than international shame. Every image of a Chinese vessel confronting Philippine ships is framed in state media as proof that China “defends its sovereignty” with resolve. The cost of backing down, even slightly, would be seen as weakness, emboldening rivals and undermining the Party’s nationalist credentials.
This dynamic produces a cycle of escalation whenever the Philippines shines a spotlight on Chinese provocations. Each released video or press statement puts pressure on Beijing to answer not with retreat but with a show of strength. That means deploying bigger vessels, using more aggressive tactics, or raising the symbolic stakes by landing personnel or raising flags on contested features. The result is a tit-for-tat pattern where each round of exposure triggers an even bolder move from China, making the waters more dangerous. Far from deterring conflict, transparency traps both sides in a spiral of action and reaction, where Manila feels compelled to expose, and Beijing feels compelled to escalate. In this way, the very strategy designed to deter aggression may be hardening the CCP’s resolve and increasing the risk of a serious incident.
The Fragility of Alliances and the Risk of Entanglement
The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States has long been considered Manila’s strongest shield against Chinese aggression, but it is also a double-edged sword. The treaty, signed in 1951, obligates both countries to defend each other if either is attacked in the Pacific region. In recent years, Washington has clarified that this commitment extends to Philippine forces, vessels, and aircraft operating in the South China Sea. Yet the ambiguity surrounding the definition of a “triggering incident” remains a source of anxiety. General Romeo Brawner, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, has warned that provocations at contested areas like Second Thomas Shoal or Scarborough Shoal could cross a “red line” and unintentionally drag both nations into a larger conflict. Each Chinese collision, water cannon strike, or blockade raises the risk of activating the treaty, forcing Washington and Manila to choose between escalation and credibility.
Complicating this further is the “Trump Factor.” With Donald Trump poised to possibly return to the White House, uncertainty looms large over U.S. foreign policy. During his first term, Trump openly questioned the value of long-standing alliances, demanded greater financial contributions from partners, and often reduced security commitments to political bargaining chips. For Manila, this unpredictability poses a serious problem. While President Joe Biden has emphasized “ironclad” U.S. commitments, a shift in leadership could replace strategic consistency with political theater. Trump’s transactional style could undermine Philippine confidence in the MDT, leaving China emboldened to test the limits of America’s willingness to act.
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Even beyond Trump, there is the issue of allies’ “reputational fatigue.” Washington’s credibility has been strained by its uneven responses to crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. The protracted nature of U.S. support for Kyiv, coupled with hesitations in addressing conflicts like the Israel-Palestine crisis, has led some nations to question whether the U.S. can truly manage simultaneous commitments across the globe. China exploits this fatigue by framing U.S. support for the Philippines as hypocritical, accusing Washington of double standards in upholding international law. Beijing’s narrative attempts to turn Manila’s transparency strategy back against it, painting the Philippines as merely a pawn of a declining and overstretched superpower.
Adding to this fragility is the limited support from European allies. While countries like the UK, France, and Germany have expressed concern about Chinese aggression and occasionally deploy naval vessels to the Indo-Pacific, their commitments remain largely symbolic. Europe’s strategic bandwidth is already consumed by the Russo-Ukrainian war, the ongoing instability in the Middle East, and domestic political and economic pressures. For these nations, the South China Sea, thousands of miles away, ranks low on the list of urgent priorities. This geographic and political distance means that if China escalates against the Philippines, Manila cannot expect sustained European involvement beyond diplomatic statements and sporadic freedom of navigation patrols.
Taken together, these dynamics reveal how fragile Manila’s reliance on alliances truly is. The MDT with the U.S. is powerful but carries the danger of entanglement; the unpredictability of Trump-era politics looms over future commitments; America’s global credibility has cracks that China eagerly exploits; and European allies remain distracted and distant. In this context, the Philippines’ transparency strategy, designed to draw international support, may face diminishing returns if its allies are either too hesitant, overstretched, or unwilling to match words with actions.
A Proposed Path Forward: Giving Transparency “Teeth”
The Philippines’ “assertive transparency” strategy, documenting and publicizing every Chinese gray-zone encounter in the South China Sea has certainly raised awareness. Images of water cannons slamming into Philippine resupply ships and footage of Chinese cutters ramming smaller vessels have generated international headlines and sympathy. Yet exposure alone has not altered Beijing’s behavior. The Chinese Communist Party is not easily shamed, and in fact, public scrutiny often compels it to double down to avoid appearing weak. Instead of deterring China, transparency has sometimes fueled escalation, with each new release of footage followed by even more aggressive maneuvers. This demonstrates the core weakness of exposure without leverage: it informs, it condemns, but it does not deter. Visibility without consequences is not a shield, it risks being seen as performance rather than protection.
To make transparency meaningful, Manila must give it teeth by pairing exposure with concrete capabilities. The first step lies in denial systems, designed to make China’s harassment tactics ineffective. Denial is not about firing first but about ensuring that ramming, blocking, and intimidation simply fail to achieve their objectives. Reinforced Coast Guard vessels with stronger hulls and shock-absorbing fenders, defensive water cannons, long-range acoustic devices, and the use of drones to monitor or intercept close approaches are practical measures that raise the operational costs for China without crossing into armed conflict. Such systems deny Beijing the ability to gradually erode Philippine sovereignty through constant physical pressure. Each attempted provocation that fails becomes a deterrent in itself.
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Equally vital is enhancing maritime domain awareness. Transparency is only as powerful as the speed and accuracy of the information it captures. Right now, the Philippines suffers from patchy radar coverage and limited surveillance, leaving blind spots that Chinese vessels exploit. Building a stronger network, through coastal radar stations, satellite imagery, drone patrols, and intelligence-sharing with allies, would give Manila the ability to detect and expose Chinese activity in real time. With fuller awareness, the Philippines could shift from reacting to provocations to preempting them, catching Chinese ships before they can spin the narrative. Each radar track, each photo, and each video becomes both an operational tool and a diplomatic weapon, giving Manila the ability to seize control of the narrative before Beijing can distort it.
Finally, transparency must evolve into lawfare, using the weight of international law to impose costs on China. Every documented provocation should not only reach the press but also international courts, the UN, and allied legal systems. Filing cases before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), presenting evidence to the United Nations, and leveraging allied laws like the Magnitsky Act would transform individual incidents into part of a sustained legal offensive. Domestic legal frameworks could be designed to mandate automatic filings for damages whenever Chinese actions harm Filipino fishermen or property. Environmental destruction caused by Chinese dredging and reef damage provides another compelling basis for legal action that resonates globally. While lawfare may not bring immediate victories, it ensures that every act of coercion adds to a cumulative burden of legal and diplomatic costs that erode Beijing’s standing over time.
In short, exposure alone cannot protect Philippine sovereignty. To be effective, transparency must be tied to denial systems that blunt harassment, maritime domain awareness that strengthens operational and narrative control, and lawfare that turns evidence into sustained international pressure. Only then can Manila’s transparency strategy evolve from a spotlight into a shield, and ultimately into a weapon that forces Beijing to pay a price for every gray-zone provocation.
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Conclusion
Without a strategy to impose costs, the Philippines’ transparency efforts risk becoming little more than a chronicle of its own erosion, a vivid but powerless record of ground being lost inch by inch. “Assertive transparency” has value in exposing Beijing’s aggression to the world, but exposure without consequence emboldens, rather than restrains, a rival that thrives on shows of strength. If Manila wants its strategy to do more than generate headlines, it must link transparency with deterrence: denial systems that make gray-zone tactics fail, maritime domain awareness that removes blind spots, and lawfare that transforms every incident into legal and diplomatic liability for China. Only by combining visibility with tangible consequences can the Philippines ensure that each Chinese provocation carries a cost and that the story its transparency tells is not one of slow retreat, but of resilience and resolve in defending sovereignty.
