Geo-Politics

How China has established it Dash Line Claims of South China Sea over time?

The South China Sea’s new ten-Dash Line, transformed from the nine-dash line, which was first delineated on a Chinese map in 1947, has emerged as a central and contentious element in global geopolitical dialogues. In July 2016, an international tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, delivered a landmark ruling, declaring that China’s use of the Nine-Dash Line to assert historical rights over the South China Sea had no legal basis. Despite this judgment, China maintained its territorial claims, further intensifying regional tensions. The Nine-Dash Line’s scope covers a wide expanse, including various islands, shoals, and reefs claimed by multiple nations. The line’s deliberate ambiguity has complicated discussions surrounding sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea, leading to ongoing disputes and diplomatic challenges. China’s recent publication of a new national map featuring a “10-dash line” has reignited concerns and raised questions about the region’s future.

Defining the Nine-Dash Line

The nine-dash line, sometimes referred to as the eleven-dash line by Taiwan, has been a source of ongoing tension and disputes in the South China Sea. It represents a set of line segments on various maps used to assert the territorial claims by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea. The contested area encompasses a vast expanse, including the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Island, the Macclesfield Bank, the Scarborough Shoal, and the Vereker Banks. These territories have been subject to land reclamation efforts by various countries, including China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The nine-dash line’s ambiguity continues to be a source of concern and a focal point in discussions surrounding sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea.

China’s Stance and Actions

The history of the nine-dash line is intricate, with its evolution spanning several decades. It was originally introduced as an eleven-dash line in a map published by the Republic of China in 1947. However, in 1952, two dashes were removed from the Gulf of Tonkin, seen as a diplomatic concession to North Vietnam. This transformation in the line, initially consisting of eleven dashes, was influenced by political shifts and goodwill gestures, notably Chairman Mao Zedong’s decision to relinquish claims in the Gulf of Tonkin. This highlights how diplomacy played a pivotal role in shaping the line and underscores its adaptability in response to changing diplomatic relations, leading to tensions and disputes with neighboring countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This maritime boundary, spanning decades, illustrates the malleability of geopolitical boundaries when influenced by diplomatic gestures and changing political dynamics, demonstrating the intricacies and multifaceted nature of disputes in the South China Sea.

A Glimpse of Evolving South China Sea Demarcations

The recent history of the South China Sea has seen a series of critical events and disputes among the claimant states. Let’s get back to January 19, 1974, when Chinese forces seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam. Subsequent confrontations include a clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces in March 1988, after China’s occupation of Fiery Cross and Cuarteron reefs in the Spratlys, leading to casualties among Vietnamese sailors. The year 1994 marked a significant development when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into effect, establishing a legal framework for maritime jurisdiction, including territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves. In 1995, China’s navy occupied Mischief Reef, leading to skirmishes with Philippine naval forces. The year 2002 witnessed an agreement between ASEAN member states and China on the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with the intent to create a Code of Conduct. In May 2009, China submitted the “nine-dash line” map in response to a joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam, raising further concerns.

The situation escalated in April 2012, when China asserted control over Scarborough Shoal, following a standoff prompted by the Philippine Navy’s attempt to arrest Chinese fishermen. The Philippines initiated an arbitration case under UNCLOS in January 2013 to challenge Chinese claims, and China commenced land reclamation and construction on several features in the Spratlys in late 2013. In May 2014, Vietnamese and Chinese vessels collided as Vietnam tried to prevent the placement of a Chinese oil rig in disputed waters. The United States started freedom of navigation operations, in the South China Sea in October 2015. A significant milestone occurred on July 12, 2016, when an arbitral tribunal in The Hague, found that China’s nine-dash line had no legal basis under UNCLOS. In July 2018, China and ASEAN agreed on a Single Draft Negotiating Text for the Code of Conduct. A notable standoff began in December 2019, involving China, Malaysia, and Vietnam over the deployment of a Malaysian drillship. More recently, in March 2021, the Philippines demanded the withdrawal of around 200 Chinese vessels, including suspected maritime militia boats, from waters around Whitsun Reef in the Spratlys.

The 2016 International Tribunal Ruling

On July 12, 2016, a significant turning point was reached in the ongoing dispute surrounding the Nine-Dash Line when an international tribunal, known as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, issued a landmark ruling. This tribunal unequivocally declared that the Nine-Dash Line lacked any “legal basis” for making historical claims to the South China Sea—a body of water that had been claimed, in part, by six different governments. This verdict stood as a pivotal moment, emphasizing the critical importance of adhering to international law when settling territorial disputes and significantly challenging China’s maritime ambitions.

In the wake of the tribunal’s verdict, Beijing responded with a complex blend of indignation and obstinacy, vehemently challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction and declining to acknowledge the ramifications of the judgment. China persisted in asserting its dominion over the South China Sea, especially in regions that overlapped with territorial assertions proffered by neighboring nations like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. This sequence of events accentuated the intricate interplay between global legal norms and domestic interests in the enduring dispute pertaining to the Nine-Dash Line, a conundrum that continues to stoke regional frictions within the South China Sea.

Evolution of the 10-Dash Line

China’s publication of a new national map, featured in ‘China’s 2023 Ministry of Natural Resources map’, has once again sparked strong reactions from countries disputing its validity. The move has captured the attention of observers, sparking debates and concerns in Southeast Asia and beyond. While the appearance of the tenth dash line isn’t entirely novel, its reintegration with the original nine-dash line on the latest map holds symbolic and geopolitical implications. This development not only reaffirms China’s ambitious territorial claims, but also raises important questions about China’s regional intentions.

One of the key ramifications of this map is its impact on cross-strait relations, particularly concerning Taiwan. The inclusion of the tenth dash line on the map serves to symbolically subsume Taiwan’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, aligning Taipei more closely with Beijing’s nationalist agenda. The new map has also captured the attention of countries further south, as it denotes the dash line as a “national boundary,” using shading that extends from the nine-dashed lines within the South China Sea. This visual effect seems to project China’s territorial claims closer to the coastlines of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam. While these claims aren’t substantively altered from previous Chinese maps, the ambiguity of the dash line’s status remains concerning for neighboring nations. Amid this uncertainty, Indonesia, for example, may find its sensitivities in the South China Sea reignited as the tenth dash bisects Indonesia’s gas-rich Exclusive Economic Zone off the Natuna’s coast, potentially reopening issues that Jakarta had believed were resolved through earlier bilateral assurances.

As a result, even though the claims in the South China Sea aren’t the foremost concern for all Southeast Asian nations, China’s evolving approach continues to elicit a sense of disquiet among regional nations and global observers alike. It’s imperative to underline that maps, in and of themselves, do not carry any inherent legal authority as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Consequently, China’s paramount challenge lies in the imperative to align its South China Sea assertions with the framework of international law. This matter has been gaining escalating global attention, particularly in light of the amplified scrutiny directed at the contested islands, coral formations, and rocky outcrops within the region.

Changing Maps and Ambiguities

China’s recent publication of a new map, known as the ’10-dash line,’ asserting territorial claims over much of the South China Sea, has escalated regional tensions and challenged the rules-based international order. This move disregards the 2016 international court ruling against China’s ‘nine-dash line’ claims and has raised concerns among ASEAN states and India. The timing, coinciding with India hosting the G20 summit, underlines China’s disregard for diplomatic resolution.

This could lead to regional security challenges and necessitate collective responses to address China’s unilateral behavior. It places China’s actions in a broader context of international diplomacy, prompting a reevaluation of diplomatic relations and a consideration of how these disputes may impact countries beyond the immediate region. This map has now made China’s intentions even more transparent, with significant consequences at regional and global realms.

Cultural and Diplomatic Entanglements

China’s “nine-dash line,” a symbol of its claims over the South China Sea, has inadvertently found its way into global popular culture, triggering political disputes and diplomatic entanglements. Recent examples include Vietnam’s ban of the film “Uncharted” due to a controversial scene featuring the nine-dash line and the Philippines’ protests against Netflix’s series “Pine Gap” for its depiction of the line, leading to the series removal from distribution setups.

While it serves to illustrate China’s South China Sea claims, the Chinese Communist Party has never explicitly defined its precise meaning, leaving international observers, legal scholars, and analysts to decipher its implications. Some see it as a maritime border, while moderate legal scholars argue for sovereignty and rights within UNCLOS boundaries. Nevertheless, concerns linger about its potential to signal Beijing’s broader territorial ambitions, including areas not subject to sovereign appropriation.

Beyond popular culture, the nine-dash line has been featured in various forms, including ESPN’s televised map and Chinese e-passports, which were declined by the Philippines and Vietnam. Its role in popular media has added to the contentious narrative of maritime territorialization, reinforcing sovereignty over maritime territories. While the contentious line remains disputed and its compatibility with international law is under scrutiny, the South China Sea conflict continues to involve complex legal challenges, diplomatic efforts, and military activities, with no resolution in sight. These ongoing tensions emphasize the multifaceted nature of the dispute, reflecting its status as a global concern, as nations strive to assert their maritime rights and address conflicting claims.

Analysis

Shoulder-to-Shoulder: The 2025 Balikatan Exercise and Its Powerful Implications for Asia’s Shifting Military Balance

“We don’t train for war because we want it, we train to prevent it,” declared Lt. Gen. James Glynn, summing up the intensity and intent behind the most realistic Balikatan exercise in history. Against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific, the 2025 Balikatan drills aren’t just routine joint training, they’re a bold statement. For the first time ever, U.S. and Philippine forces executed a full-scale battle simulation, including live missile strikes, coordinated island defense, and counter-invasion operations near the Luzon Strait, just 200 kilometers from Taiwan.

As tensions continue to surge in the South China Sea, and China ramps up pressure on Taiwan, this year’s Balikatan marks a historic shift from symbolic cooperation to hard-power deterrence. It reflects the evolving urgency among allies to prepare for worst-case scenarios, not tomorrow, but today.This is more than just a military drill. It’s a strategic message: the Philippines is stepping forward as a frontline ally, while the U.S. doubles down on deterrence in Asia’s most contested waters. Balikatan 2025 is proof that in the face of rising Chinese aggression, alliance strength and regional readiness are no longer optional, they’re survival.

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Background on Balikatan Exercises

The word “Balikatan” comes from the Filipino phrase meaning “shoulder-to-shoulder,” a powerful symbol of the enduring partnership between the Philippines and the United States. Rooted in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, Balikatan began as a modest series of joint training exercises designed to enhance military cooperation and interoperability between the two long-time allies.Over the decades, Balikatan has evolved in both scale and complexity. What once started as basic field exercises has grown into a multifaceted military operation involving thousands of troops, cutting-edge technology, and strategic coordination across land, sea, air, and now, cyberspace.

Each iteration reflects the shifting security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.But Balikatan 2025 stands in a league of its own. With over 17,000 personnel, the largest force to date, and including live-fire missile drills, amphibious assaults, and simulated island invasions, this year’s exercise is unprecedented in both scope and realism. It marks the first time the allies have conducted a full-scale battle simulation near the Luzon Strait, a critical chokepoint between the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. As threats grow more complex and urgent, Balikatan has become a vital rehearsal for real-world contingencies, not just a drill, but a deterrent.

What’s New in 2025: A Full-Scale Combat Simulation

Balikatan 2025 is rewriting the playbook. For the first time in the history of US-Philippines joint drills, a full-scale combat simulation has been launched, and it’s nothing short of historic. This year’s exercise features live-fire missile drills, including the use of HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), NMESIS (Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System), and even the ground-launched Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system, capable of striking targets over 1,600 kilometers away. These advanced systems simulate striking enemy warships and coastal defenses, a clear signal to any potential aggressor.A key highlight is the joint defense scenario against a simulated island invasion in the Luzon Strait, a strategic maritime chokepoint linking the South China Sea and the Pacific, just north of Taiwan.

Anti-ship operations, amphibious assaults, and air support coordination are all part of the integrated mission set.New this year is the incorporation of Maritime Key Terrain Security Operations (MKTSO), simulated capture and defense of strategic islets and sea lanes, closely resembling contested zones in the South China Sea and near Taiwan’s southern approach.Balikatan 2025 is no longer just bilateral. It has transformed into a multinational effort, with the participation of Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. Their inclusion reflects not only growing concern over Chinese assertiveness, but also a broadening regional and global commitment to Indo-Pacific security. This year’s drill is a rehearsal for deterrence, with eyes set firmly on real-world flashpoints.

Strategic Location: Why the Philippines Matters

In the evolving chessboard of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, the Philippines stands as a critical node in the United States’ First and Second Island Chain strategy, a layered defense concept designed to contain China’s maritime ambitions. The First Island Chain, stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines and Borneo, is seen as the front line of deterrence. The Second Island Chain, further east, provides depth for counter-offensive operations and logistical support.The Philippines’ geography is central to this equation. Its northernmost province of Batanes lies just 200 kilometers from Taiwan and sits near the Bashi Channel, a vital undersea communication and naval transit route.

In the west, Second Thomas Shoal, where a grounded Philippine ship acts as a forward outpost, remains a flashpoint in the South China Sea.The modernization and strategic use of bases in Batanes, Palawan, and Balabac give Manila and its allies key vantage points to monitor and, if necessary, disrupt hostile maritime activity. These locations can host surveillance systems, anti-ship missiles, and rapid deployment forces, making the archipelago not just a passive ally, but a launchpad for regional defense and deterrence. In any Taiwan contingency or South China Sea standoff, the Philippines is no longer a bystander, it’s a frontline player.

A New Cold War Weapon? NMESIS Deployed in the Philippines During Balikatan

Geopolitical Implications and China’s Reaction

China’s response to Balikatan 2025 was swift and sharp. A spokesperson from Beijing echoed a familiar warning: “Those who play with fire will burn themselves.” To the Chinese Communist Party, the enhanced U.S.-Philippines alliance, particularly the simulated defense of Taiwan and joint anti-ship operations in the Luzon Strait, crosses a strategic red line.Beijing has long viewed both Taiwan and the South China Sea as non-negotiable core interests. Any perceived challenge to its sovereignty, especially from the U.S. led military coalitions, is seen as a direct provocation. The expanded U.S. military footprint in the Philippines, including the use of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites near Taiwan, is deeply unsettling for China’s leadership.

The deployment of advanced U.S. missile systems like HIMARS and NMESIS, coupled with multi-nation participation, signals a clear shift toward active regional deterrence.This has raised fears of an escalating arms race in the Indo-Pacific. China is already responding with more frequent air and naval patrols, enhanced missile testing, and increased militarization of artificial islands in contested waters. The risk is no longer theoretical: the proximity of rival forces increases the chances of a miscalculation that could spiral into open conflict.Balikatan 2025 sends a strategic message, but whether that message deters China or provokes further aggression remains the defining question of this decade.

The Message to the Indo-Pacific and Beyond

Balikatan 2025 is not just a bilateral military exercise, it’s a geopolitical broadcast. The U.S. has made it clear: its strategic pivot remains firmly focused on the Indo-Pacific. By “assuming risk elsewhere to prioritize China as the sole pacing threat,” the Pentagon has recalibrated its global defense posture. That means fewer resources in Europe and the Middle East, and more firepower, partnerships, and deterrence measures in Asia.Interestingly, this shift has transcended political divides. Despite a change in leadership, Trump’s second term continues Biden’s Indo-Pacific momentum.

The continuity highlights bipartisan consensus in Washington: deterring China’s expansionism is America’s top strategic priority. This year’s Balikatan drills, featuring cutting-edge missile platforms, joint island-defense ops, and multinational participation, exemplify this resolve.But the message isn’t meant to provoke. As Gen. Romeo Brawner emphasized, “Our goal is deterrence, not aggression.” Balikatan 2025 is a visible reminder to allies and adversaries alike that the Philippines and the U.S., together with like-minded partners, are ready to defend peace, sovereignty, and the rules-based order. To the Indo-Pacific and beyond, the takeaway is clear: a stable region starts with credible deterrence and unity among allies.

https://indopacificreport.com/2024/05/05/what-is-the-strategic-message-behind-us-missile-deployment-in-the-balikatan/

Defense Cooperation: A Strengthened Alliance

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., U.S.-Philippine defense cooperation has experienced a powerful resurgence. After years of uncertainty during the Duterte administration, the alliance has regained momentum, symbolized by the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), now granting the U.S. access to 9 strategic Philippine bases, up from the previous 5. These include new forward-operating sites in northern Luzon and Palawan, positioned near hotspots like Taiwan and the South China Sea.This shift reflects renewed trust and alignment between Manila and Washington, especially as regional tensions with China intensify.

The 2025 Balikatan drills serve not only as a training opportunity but as a testament to revived military interoperability. U.S. and Philippine forces are now better integrated, from command-and-control systems to real-time battlefield coordination.Balikatan also fosters joint readiness, simulating real-world scenarios that both nations could face in a crisis. From launching HIMARS to defending island chains, troops from both sides are developing muscle memory for a conflict that everyone hopes to prevent, but must be prepared for. In this era of strategic competition, the Philippines has become a frontline partner in upholding regional peace and deterrence.

Future Outlook: What Comes Next?

The trajectory of the Balikatan exercises signals an era of even greater multinational cooperation and regional preparedness. With nations like Japan, Australia, the UK, France, and Canada participating in 2025, the stage is set for future drills to expand into full-spectrum Indo-Pacific deterrence operations. Analysts suggest that upcoming iterations could include stronger coordination with QUAD nations and even deeper collaboration with ASEAN partners, reinforcing a collective defense posture.Beyond alliance-building, the spotlight is also on the continued modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces.

Investments in radar systems, coastal defense, and air mobility, combined with hands-on experience from these war games, aim to close capability gaps and raise operational standards. The goal: a self-reliant, agile military able to secure its territory and contribute meaningfully to regional peace.Strategically, the message is clear, the Philippines is no longer a passive bystander caught between great powers. Through Balikatan and beyond, it is asserting itself as an active, reliable defense partner, central to upholding the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As tensions rise, Manila is not just preparing, it’s positioning itself as a key player in shaping the region’s security future.

Conclusion: More Than Just an Exercise

Balikatan 2025 is more than a routine military exercise; it’s a bold demonstration of resolve, unity, and regional leadership. As the first-ever full-scale combat simulation between the U.S. and the Philippines, it highlights a deepened commitment to preserving peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. With new partners and unprecedented scale, this year’s drills reflect a unified front against aggression and a clear message to global powers. In an era of rising uncertainty, “shoulder-to-shoulder” is not just a slogan, it’s a strategic necessity for ensuring a secure, prosperous future for the region.

Philippines, US Launch Mid Range Missile System in Balikatan

Analysis

BREAKING: U.S. Marines Join Forces with the Philippines Troops to Defend Key Islands

BREAKING: The largest-ever Balikatan exercises have begun with 17,000 troops deploying advanced missile systems near Taiwan Strait as tensions with China escalate.

“They’re watching every move we make,” muttered Lieutenant James Wilson, tracking a suspicious vessel through his binoculars from the command post overlooking Palawan’s western shore. “Third foreign surveillance ship this morning.” Philippine Marine Captain Ana Santos nodded grimly. “Just like the confrontation in Scarborough Shoal last month. They push, we stand firm, they call it provocation.” The command centre hummed with activity as American and Filipino officers coordinated the unprecedented joint deployment of NMESIS anti-ship missile systems, a clear message to Beijing after months of increasingly dangerous encounters in disputed waters.
“President Marcos arrives in two hours for the missile defense demonstration,” Santos said, checking her watch. “Intel reports unusual movement near the Taiwan Strait.” Wilson lowered his binoculars. “This isn’t just another exercise anymore, is it?” “Not since Defense Secretary Hegseth announced doubling down on our alliance,” Santos replied. “When Lieutenant General Glynn said ‘nothing builds bonds more quickly than shared adversity’ this morning, everyone knew exactly what adversity he meant.”0
Outside, the tropical heat shimmered above the landing zones where Marines from both nations moved with practiced precision, their shoulder patches, American and Filipino, side by side under the unforgiving sun, embodying the “Balikatan” spirit as storm clouds gathered on the horizon.
“Seventeen incursions in the past month, a 340% increase since January,” Colonel Javier Santos reported, sliding satellite images across the tactical display as U.S. Marine Commander Alexandra Reyes studied the Philippine Sea boundaries now dotted with foreign vessels.

“That’s why we’ve repositioned our NMESIS batteries to cover these three critical chokepoints,” Reyes replied, marking coordinates on the digital map where advanced missile systems would create overlapping fields of deterrence across the archipelago’s vulnerable eastern approaches.
Philippine Defense Minister Carlos Batangay entered the command center, acknowledging the officers with a nod. “Washington just confirmed the additional P-8 Poseidon surveillance flights, four daily rotations beginning tomorrow. President Marcos wants to know if that’s sufficient coverage for our joint maritime awareness initiative.”
“It triples our monitoring capability,” Reyes answered, “especially with the new AI-enhanced recognition systems identifying vessel types with 97% accuracy. The Chinese maritime militia can’t disguise their movements anymore.” Outside the reinforced operations bunker, battalions of Filipino and American troops conducted synchronized amphibious landing exercises, the first of eight planned joint operations across previously vulnerable islands where China had contested territorial claims. Military analysts called it the most significant strengthening of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty in decades, transforming symbolic military cooperation into an integrated defense strategy with real tactical capabilities and shared command structures.
“FOB Sentinel is operational,” Lieutenant Colonel Maria Rodriguez announced, her voice carrying across the command center where American and Philippine officers tracked deployment progress on real-time digital maps. “That completes our network of forward positions spanning the entire eastern maritime approach.”
Marine Captain James Wilson nodded, updating status markers on his tactical display. “Logistics corridors secured between all six locations. Supply chains now operating at 94% efficiency despite the challenging island terrain.”
“The coastal radar integration is complete,” Philippine Navy Commander Dante Reyes added. “Our maritime awareness grid now covers 78% of contested waters with overlapping surveillance zones. Chinese vessels can’t approach within 50 nautical miles of our outlying territories without detection.”
Outside, CH-53K King Stallion helicopters thundered overhead, ferrying defensive equipment to reinforce the Philippines’ westernmost islands—territories previously vulnerable to foreign encroachment due to limited military presence.
“The Admiral wants an update on the amphibious defense drills,” Wilson said, reviewing after-action reports from the morning’s exercises.
“Fifth Battalion reduced response time to under 27 minutes,” Rodriguez replied. “That’s a 40% improvement over last quarter’s capabilities assessment. The integrated command structure is working.”
Beyond the command center windows, joint patrol vessels departed for another monitoring rotation through disputed waters, their advanced electronic surveillance systems capable of distinguishing between fishing boats and disguised maritime militia. In the distance, Marine units practice rapid coastal fortification techniques designed to transform vulnerable beach approaches into defensible positions within hours—a capability deemed critical for protecting the scattered island territories that had increasingly become flash points in regional territorial disputes.

https://indopacificreport.com/2025/04/23/italys-philippine-submarine/
“This isn’t just about boots on the ground anymore,” Admiral Sarah Chen remarked, gesturing toward the holographic display showing defense arrangements spanning the South China Sea. “It’s about creating an integrated deterrence network that makes aggression too costly to contemplate.”
Philippine Defense Secretary Ramon Alvarez nodded, studying the deployment patterns. “The second Typhon array changes the strategic calculus entirely. Beijing’s freedom of movement in these waters drops by 60% overnight.”
“And that’s before factoring in our new trilateral exercises with Japan,” added U.S. Marine General Michael Torres. “Their maritime self-defense forces join us next month for the expanded Balikatan operations.”
A junior officer approached with a tablet displaying recent intelligence. “Sir, our diplomatic channels report China has called an emergency meeting with ASEAN representatives. They’re proposing new economic incentives to nations willing to limit foreign military presence.”
“The classic carrot approach,” Torres observed. “While they’re offering infrastructure investment packages with one hand, they’re establishing new artificial island outposts with the other.”
“Which is precisely why our approach goes beyond military countermeasures,” Chen replied. “The new security assistance packages for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia include not just hardware but comprehensive maritime domain awareness systems. Five billion in total, with another three billion for economic resilience programs.”
Outside the command center, Filipino and American forces conducted integrated coastal defense simulations, practicing rapid reinforcement scenarios across the archipelago’s scattered islands, once isolated outposts now transformed into key nodes in an expandable defensive network that could rapidly incorporate Japanese, Australian, and potentially Taiwanese forces in a crisis scenario.
“Twenty years ago, we conducted symbolic exercises,” Alvarez said quietly. “Today, we’re reshaping the entire regional security architecture.”

Reshaping Regional Security: A New Era in the South China Sea

As dawn breaks over the contested waters of the South China Sea, the joint deployment of U.S. and Philippine Marines represents far more than a routine military exercise. It signals a fundamental shift in regional security dynamics that will reverberate across Southeast Asia for years to come.
The establishment of forward operating bases across strategic Philippine islands, coupled with the deployment of advanced Typhon missile arrays and integrated surveillance networks, has effectively created a new defensive perimeter that challenges long-standing assumptions about power projection in these disputed waters.
“This isn’t simply about countering any single nation’s ambitions,” noted regional security analyst Dr. Elena Santos. “It’s about establishing a sustainable security architecture that preserves freedom of navigation and territorial integrity for all regional stakeholders.”
As military partnerships deepen and expand to include other key allies like Japan, Australia, and potentially additional ASEAN nations, the strategic calculus has fundamentally changed. What began as bilateral exercises has evolved into a sophisticated multilateral defense framework with diplomatic, economic, and informational dimensions complementing traditional military approaches.
The message being sent across the region is unmistakable: the era of unchallenged maritime expansion is over, replaced by a networked defense strategy that makes territorial aggression prohibitively costly. For nations throughout Southeast Asia watching these developments, the implications are profound, a new balance of power is taking shape, one that may ultimately determine the future of this crucial maritime crossroads.

U.S. Deployed Anti-Ship Missiles in the Philippines to Deter China!

Analysis

Italy’s Fincantieri, Germany’s TKMS team up for the Philippine Submarine Program

On April 10, 2025, Philippine coastal radars detected an unidentified Chinese submarine gliding silently just beyond Palawan’s reef line. Within hours, local fishermen reported deepfrequency vibrations beneath their bancas, prompting an urgent scramble of Navy patrol boats. This stealthy incursion—enabled by advanced airindependent propulsion, magnetically inert hulls, and acousticdampening coatings—laid bare Manila’s critical undersea vulnerability and highlight the imperative for a homegrown deterrent force, capable of safeguarding the nation’s 2.2 millionsquarekilometer Exclusive Economic Zone. This is not an isolated incident: in recent years, similar stealth probes have tested Philippine waters with increasing boldness. Such recurring undersea breaches catalyzed a fundamental reevaluation of maritime strategy, compelling Manila’s leadership to view submarines not as optional assets but as pivotal guardians of sovereign waters.

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From Surveillance to Submersibles

For decades, the Philippines’ maritime defenses have revolved around surface ships, coastal radar stations, and maritime patrol aircraft. Yet as drones, coastguard cutters, and surface combatants proliferated, the undersea domain remained a blind spot. Intelligence assessments throughout the 2010s flagged increasing Chinese submarine transits—ranging from aging Songclass patrol boats to modern Yuanclass boats equipped with airindependent propulsion (AIP)—through contested waters near the Spratly Islands. Despite public outcry over Scarborough Shoal and Reed Bank shadowboxing, policymakers hesitated to invest in submarines, citing budget constraints and the complexity of underwater operations.
The Palawan sighting shattered the illusion that the Philippines could deter covert maritime probes through surface presence alone. By crossing the reef line undetected, the Chinese submarine demonstrated that AIPequipped boats can linger for weeks beneath the thermocline, evading surface and aerial sensors. Suddenly, Manila’s lack of a submersible fleet was no longer just an academic gap but a strategic liability. In response, the Department of National Defense (DND) elevated the submarine program to the top of its Horizon III Modernization Initiative (2023–2028), transitioning from feasibility studies to contract negotiations in record time.

Strengthening Philippine’s Maritime Defense

On April 17, 2025, the DND formalized its submarine ambitions by signing an industrial cooperation agreement with Italy’s Fincantieri and Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) to procure the U212 Near Future Submarine (NFS). In its public announcement, the DND characterized the deal as “a significant step toward modernizing and reinforcing the capabilities of our naval forces,” stressing that the NFS “is integral to securing our vast maritime domain and ensuring that our territorial waters remain safeguarded in an era of evolving security challenges.” This historic decision marks the first time the Philippine Navy will operate undersea combatants, completing its transition from a surfaceonly force to a multidomain maritime power.
Historically, Manila made two previous attempts to field submarines. In the 1970s, under President Marcos, deals with the Soviet Union for Romeoclass boats stalled amid political upheaval and maintenance challenges. In the early 2000s, exploratory talks with South Korea and Japan fizzled over financing and technologytransfer disagreements. The new ItalianGerman partnership overcomes past hurdles by embedding technology transfer, joint maintenance, and doctrinedevelopment clauses into the contract. These provisions ensure that the Philippines won’t merely receive finished submarines but will develop the institutional capacity to operate, sustain, and eventually build them.

Inside the U212 NFS Submarine

The U212 NFS is designed to excel in the contested littorals of the South China Sea. Measuring approximately 70 meters in length and displacing around 1,800 tons submerged, it blends stealth, endurance, and lethality. Its hull is constructed from nonmagnetic steel, minimizing detection by magnetic anomaly detectors, while its refined hydrodynamic shape reduces flow noise. The centerpiece of its propulsion is an advanced AIP system—likely a fuelcell design—that allows the boat to remain submerged for up to three weeks without surfacing or snorkeling. This endurance advantage is critical in archipelagic waters where frequent surfacing invites detection.
On board, the U212 NFS features a digital combat management system that fuses inputs from flank-mounted sonar arrays, bowmounted passive arrays, and towed-array sensors. These capabilities enable the crew to map underwater terrain, track multiple contacts simultaneously, and coordinate with surface and air assets in near real time. Weaponry includes heavyweight torpedoes for antiship roles, submarinelaunched antiship missiles, and the potential integration of landattack cruise missiles under future upgrade packages. Modular payload bays allow rapid reconfiguration for special operations, unmanned underwater vehicle deployments, or intelligencegathering missions, ensuring the platform adapts to Manila’s evolving strategic needs.

How strong is the Philippine Navy in 2025?

Undersea Deterrence in Practice

Deploying the U212 NFS will transform Manila’s undersea posture from reactive to proactive. In practice, stealth patrols conducted along choke points such as the Palawan Passage and the Balabac Strait will serve as invisible tripwires, compelling adversaries to treat Philippineclaimed waters as contested. The mere presence of a submarine—never seen but always suspected—alters an adversary’s calculus, raising the cost of grayzone coercion and ensuring that surface and aerial incursions carry greater risk.
Beyond deterrence, submarines provide unparalleled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Deployed in covert observation stations near disputed features like Scarborough Shoal, U212 NFS boats can monitor foreign coastguard movements, maritime militia activity, and the construction of artificial islands. Data collected from these patrols will feed into Manila’s maritime domain awareness network, integrating coastal radars, satellite imagery, and unmanned systems into a unified picture of undersea and surface traffic.
The operational doctrine will emphasize “silent deterrence,” leveraging the submarines’ low acoustic signature to uphold freedom of navigation without overt shows of force. By orchestrating undersea patrols in tandem with joint naval exercises alongside Quad and ASEAN partners, the Philippines can demonstrate its growing undersea proficiency while reinforcing collective security ties. Silent maneuvers at sea thus become a form of strategic signaling: a reminder that Manila, too, commands the unseen depths.

FullSpectrum Operational Support

Acquiring submarines is only the first step; sustaining them requires a holistic support ecosystem. The Fincantieri–TKMS agreement includes extensive training programs at Italian and German naval bases, where Philippine officers and enlisted personnel will immerse themselves in submarine operations, maintenance procedures, and tactical employment. Initial courses will cover fundamental submarine theory, damage control, and navigation, followed by advanced modules in weapons deployment, electronic warfare, and undersea communications.
Doctrine development teams—comprising DND planners and NATO advisors—will convene in Subic Bay to adapt Western undersea warfare concepts to the Philippines’ unique archipelagic geography. Simulated exercises will test multidomain integration, linking submarines with shorebased antiaircraft batteries, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) corvettes, maritime patrol aircraft, and unmanned aerial systems. Logistics nodes will be established at Subic Bay and Naval Base Camilo Osías in Cagayan, connected to European spares depots via secure shipping channels, ensuring critical components are delivered within weeks rather than months.
Maintenance regimens will follow a tiered model: routine upkeep at forwarddeployed Philippine facilities, intermediate repairs at regional support hubs, and major overhauls in European shipyards. This structure balances rapid turnaround with technical excellence, preventing extended boat downtime and preserving continuous operational availability. Over time, as local technicians accrue experience, the Philippines will assume greater responsibility for midlevel and depotlevel maintenance, reducing reliance on foreign facilities and driving down lifecycle costs.

https://indopacificreport.com/2024/11/28/which-weapons-the-philippines-need-for-its-defense-in-the-south-china-sea/

Developing Local Naval Infrastructure

Embedded within the submarine program is a longterm vision for a selfreliant defense industrial base. The industrial cooperation agreement mandates technology transfer not only for submarine systems but also for shipyard practices, quality assurance, and project management. By 2030, a dedicated submarine support facility in Subic Bay will house dry docks bespoke to the U212 hull form, pressuretesting tanks, and specialized workshops for AIP module servicing. Adjacent to the docks, the Philippine Naval Engineering Academy will offer specialized curricula in undersea systems design, welding techniques for nonmagnetic steels, and sonarcalibration procedures.
Local shipyards such as Hanjin Subic and Keppel Subic will receive capacitybuilding grants to expand their slipways, install hullalignment lasers, and train Philippine welders to Germanapproved certification levels. Concurrently, publicprivate partnerships will fund research centers focused on indigenous sensor development, noisereduction coatings, and unmanned underwater vehicles tailored to Philippine defense needs. As these capabilities mature, Manila can explore joint ventures to produce hull sections domestically, laying the groundwork for eventual coproduction of nextgeneration submarines or other undersea platforms.
This “buildasyouoperate” model ensures that every boat in the initial batch becomes a catalyst for industrial growth, workforce development, and technological innovation—transforming the Philippines from a passive buyer to an active codeveloper in the undersea domain.

Beijing’s Measured Response

On April 18, 2025, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a carefully worded advisory expressing “serious concern” over Manila’s arms procurement. The spokesperson emphasized the need for restraint, warning that “advanced submarine deployments risk escalating military tensions in the South China Sea” and urging all parties to adhere to diplomatic avenues for dispute resolution. While refraining from direct accusations, the statement reflected Beijing’s longstanding unease with any shift in regional undersea capabilities and presaged greater Chinese ASW activity—deploying surveillance ships, enhancing passive sonar arrays on artificial islands, and increasing submarine patrols near Philippine waters.
China’s calibrated response underscores a strategic paradox: the more Beijing seeks to monopolize undersea superiority, the stronger Manila’s motivation becomes to field its own silent sentinels. In this contest of shadows, each side tests the other’s resolve, using legal protests, diplomatic démarches, and intelligence posturing to shape the undersea balance without sparking open conflict.

End Words

As the first U212 NFS boats emerge from European shipyards in the late 2020s, Manila faces a critical, multidimensional roadmap. First, the Philippines must accelerate its humancapital development by expanding submarine training pipelines and incentivizing STEM careers in naval engineering. Scholarships, officercandidate programs, and civilian apprenticeships will ensure a steady influx of technical talent capable of managing complex undersea systems.
Second, Manila should fully integrate submarine operations into its national Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) framework. By linking submarines with coastal radars, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial and surface vehicles, and commercial satellite feeds, the Philippines can create a layered detection and response network that leverages platforms above and below the surface. Joint exercises with Quad partners—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—will reinforce interoperability, refine ASW tactics, and signal collective resolve.
Third, the government must sustain longterm funding commitments. Submarine acquisition and sustainment represent one of the most capitalintensive defense expenditures in Philippine history. Rigorous budget oversight, multiyear appropriations, and transparent reporting will prevent cost overruns and ensure that maintenance, upgrades, and training never fall victim to competing priorities.
Fourth, Manila should champion regional confidencebuilding measures. Proposing a Southeast Asian Code of Conduct for Submarine Operations—a framework for notification, incident avoidance, and crisis communication—can reduce the risk of underwater collisions or near-encounters that might trigger unintended escalation. Paired with joint scientific surveys in the Sulu Sea and humanitarianassistance drills in the Celebes Sea, these softpower initiatives demonstrate that submarines serve not only to deter adversaries but also to enhance collective maritime safety.
Finally, Philippine policymakers must balance hard power with smart diplomacy. While submarines will underpin a credible defense posture, Manila should continue engaging Beijing through bilateral channels, ASEAN forums, and the South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations. By coupling robust undersea capabilities with earnest diplomatic outreach, the Philippines can navigate the fine line between deterrence and dialogue—ensuring that its sovereign rights are defended, its security interests are advanced, and its commitment to regional stability remains unwavering.